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THE INNOCENCE EFFECT 
OREN GAZAL-AYAL† AND AVISHALOM TOR†† 
ABSTRACT 
  Nearly all felony convictions—about 95 percent—follow guilty 
pleas, suggesting that plea offers are very attractive to defendants 
compared to trials. Some scholars argue that plea bargains are too 
attractive and should be curtailed because they facilitate the wrongful 
conviction of innocents. Others contend that plea bargains only 
benefit innocent defendants, providing an alternative to the risk of a 
harsher sentence at trial. Hence, even while heatedly disputing their 
desirability, both camps in the debate believe that plea bargains 
commonly lead innocents to plead guilty. This Article shows, 
however, that the belief that innocents routinely plead guilty is 
overstated. We provide varied empirical evidence for the hitherto 
neglected “innocence effect,” revealing that innocents are significantly 
less likely to accept plea offers that appear attractive to similarly 
situated guilty defendants. 
  The Article further explores the psychological causes of the 
innocence effect and examines its implications for plea bargaining. 
Positively, we identify the striking “cost of innocence,” wherein 
innocents suffer harsher average sanctions than similarly situated 
guilty defendants. Yet our findings also show that the innocence effect 
directly causes an overrepresentation of the guilty among plea 
bargainers and an overrepresentation of the innocent among those 
who choose trial. In this way, the innocence effect beneficially reduces 
the rate of wrongful convictions—including accepted plea bargains—
even when compared to a system that does not allow plea bargaining. 
Normatively, our analysis finds that both detractors and supporters of 
plea bargaining should reevaluate, if not completely reverse, their 
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long-held positions to account for the causes and consequences of the 
innocence effect. The Article concludes by outlining two proposals for 
minimizing false convictions, better protecting the innocent, and 
improving the plea bargaining process altogether by accounting for 
the innocence effect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plea bargaining dominates the criminal-justice landscape in the 
United States. About 95 percent of felony convictions follow guilty 
pleas,1 and most guilty pleas result from plea bargaining.2 Despite 
their ubiquity and key role in facilitating convictions, however, the 
desirability of plea bargains is hotly debated, not least because plea 
bargains can lead innocent defendants to plead guilty.3 
Most scholars—whether detractors or supporters of this 
practice—examine plea bargaining as a decision process that 
defendants must undertake in the looming shadow of trial.4 Plea 
 
 1. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228944, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 2006: FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 1 (2010), available at http://bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf. In the federal courts, 97 percent of felony convictions follow guilty 
pleas. See MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
234184, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, at 12 tbl.9 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/ content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf. 
 2. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
29, 30 (2002). Although guilty pleas commonly follow explicit plea bargains, they sometimes 
follow an implicit bargain. Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 
I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1059 n.1 (1976). In these cases, defendants plead guilty without 
explicit negotiation but with the understanding that they will receive a sentence discount for 
waiving their right to trial. Cf. id. at 1076 (noting that in some plea-bargaining systems, “express 
pretrial bargaining need not occur at all; the judges simply sentence defendants who are 
convicted at trial more severely than defendants who plead guilty”). For the present purposes, 
however, the key observation is that guilty pleas universally occur against an institutional 
backdrop that equally encourages all similarly situated defendants—whether innocent or 
guilty—to plead guilty to obtain a plea discount. 
 3. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
50, 60 (1968) (arguing that “the greatest pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear on 
defendants who may be innocent”); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2494–96 (2004) (arguing that information deficits might lead 
innocent defendants to plead guilty). 
 4. Many scholars describe a type of cost-benefit analysis that defendants go through when 
deciding whether to plead guilty or to stand trial and not a process in which the actual 
responsibility is the decisive factor. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 61–62 (discussing how 
innocent defendants accept very lenient guilty-plea offers to avoid a risky trial); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 313–16, 320 
(1983) (laying out reasons for the ubiquity of plea bargaining and the frequency of guilty pleas); 
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (1978) (arguing that 
innocent defendants might plead guilty to avoid the trial penalty, just as innocent defendants in 
medieval Europe confessed to escape torture); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice 
Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 72–73 (1988) (showing how innocent 
defendants can be encouraged to plead guilty when the plea offer is adjusted to the probability 
of conviction and expected post-trial sentence); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as a Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1935–49 (1992) (illustrating how plea bargaining 
may lead innocent defendants to plead guilty); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End 
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bargains are agreements wherein prosecutors offer defendants a 
reduction in criminal charges or sentence recommendations or in 
which courts offer sentence concessions in return for guilty pleas. 
When faced with a plea offer, a defendant must determine whether he 
or she finds its certain but discounted sanction more attractive than 
trial. In the simplest shadow-of-trial model, for example, defendants 
accept plea bargains that offer sanctions lower than the expected 
value of trial, which is calculated as the anticipated sentence in the 
case of a conviction at trial multiplied by the probability of such a 
conviction.5 
Shadow-of-trial scholarship assumes that defendants’ culpability 
has no bearing on plea-bargaining behavior beyond the effect that 
culpability already exerts on the probability of conviction.6 To 
illustrate, imagine a guilty defendant facing, based on the existing 
evidence, an 80 percent probability of conviction at trial and ten years 
of imprisonment if convicted. In the shadow of this looming sentence, 
the defendant is very likely to find attractive, for instance, a 
prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty in return for a two-year sentence.7 
Yet the extant shadow-of-trial literature further presumes that our 
 
of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 88–99 (2005) (discussing the 
development of and rationale for plea bargaining and noting the high percentage of guilty pleas 
in adjudicated cases in federal courts).  
 5. Although this is the basic structure of shadow-of-trial analyses, actual models typically 
take into account additional factors like risk aversion, which we discuss infra Part II.B.3, and the 
cost of trial, which does not affect the present analysis and which we therefore do not discuss 
further here; cf., e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social 
Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 757 (1983) (“[A] welfare-theoretic argument in favor of plea 
bargaining need not be based on a consideration of the resource cost of trial proceedings.”). But 
see William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 99–100 (1971) 
(summarizing the role of trial costs in plea bargaining). 
 6. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1984 
(1992) (“Innocence by itself (that is, apart from its link to particular evidence) can have only a 
small impact on the odds of conviction.”); cf. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 316 (“It is only from 
observing trials that the prosecutor and defendant may infer the probable outcome of pending 
cases in order to bargain.”). Some scholars have noted in passing that innocence might play an 
independent role, but none have developed the argument further or provided evidence of the 
role that innocence plays. For example, Professor William Landes argues that  
[t]he question of whether the defendant did in fact commit the crime he is charged 
with does not explicitly enter the analysis. The prosecutor and defendant have been 
assumed to react to the probability of conviction and other variables in choosing 
between settling and going to trial, while their behavior has not been directly 
influenced by the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
Landes, supra note 5, at 68–69. Yet, Landes also notes—without much further explanation—
that innocents might be averse to lying and hence less willing to plea. Id. at 69. 
 7. More precisely, the defendant’s propensity to accept the plea offer will depend on his 
risk preferences. For further detail, see infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
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hypothetical defendant would be as likely to plea bargain if she were 
innocent rather than guilty. After all, shadow-of-trial models assume 
that the expected sanction at trial is the only case-related variable that 
determines whether a defendant will plea bargain. A defendant’s 
actual innocence, on the other hand, should have no direct bearing on 
this process. 
Opponents and proponents of plea bargaining commonly believe 
that defendants’ culpability has little effect on the overall rate of plea 
bargaining. These scholars reason that prosecutors use their 
discretion to adjust plea offers based on the probability of conviction, 
making more lenient offers in weak cases to guarantee agreement.8 
Defendants who face weaker cases—such as most innocents—simply 
are offered more lenient sentences that make plea bargaining as 
attractive as it is for defendants in stronger cases.9 Hence, innocents 
 
 8. See Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 752 (showing that unless the post-trial sentence 
is much higher than what would be socially desirable, prosecutors adjust the plea offer to the 
harshest sanction that the defendant is willing to accept based on the probability of conviction); 
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1946 (“[P]rosecutors must take into account the odds of 
acquittal when making plea offers. Thus, defendants who can . . . point to evidence that supports 
their innocence claims can either obtain a dismissal or a favorable plea offer.”). Note that in 
weak cases the parties must rely on charge bargaining, in which the prosecutor removes or 
reduces the charges in return for the guilty plea to avoid judicial rejection of the agreed-upon 
sentence. See Wright & Miller, supra note 2, at 32–33 (“Without careful initial screening, the 
prosecuting trial attorney who refuses to negotiate for reduced charges faces the risk of 
acquittals . . . .”). Indeed, rather than being the exception, charge bargaining in weak cases is the 
norm in the criminal-justice system. See Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public 
Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior Records, and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 253, 257 (1989) (surveying 166 city and county prosecutors and noting that their responses 
“indicated an overwhelming propensity to moderate the harshness of plea bargain terms to 
defendants if the government had a weak case against them”). 
 9. See supra note 6. Moreover, although most cases against innocents will be weak and 
therefore dismissed at earlier stages, once a decision to prosecute a weak case has been made, 
plea bargaining should be even more likely, as there are many indications that prosecutors will 
go a long way to avoid losing cases. See Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the 
Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1045–46 
(1972) (concluding, based on interviews with federal prosecutors, that convictions are the 
central performance standard and that an increased rate of nonconvictions raises questions and 
creates anxieties); see also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 106–07 (noting that prosecutors are often 
evaluated by the rate of convictions and thus care much more about conviction than 
sentencing); Bibas, supra note 3, at 2471 (“[Prosecutors] may further their careers by racking up 
good win-loss records, in which every plea bargain counts as a win but trials risk being losses.”). 
Therefore, because they are more concerned about handling a full-fledged trial when the case is 
weak, prosecutors make a greater effort to assure that a plea bargain is struck. We should thus 
find, if anything, higher rates of plea bargaining among those weaker cases that nevertheless are 
prosecuted, in which innocents are likely to be overrepresented. 
GAZAY-AYAL & TOR IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012  2:02 PM 
344 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:339 
may accept a discounted plea offer and plead guilty rather than risk 
trial, despite facing a weaker case than many guilty defendants.10 
Although nearly all scholars unquestioningly accept the 
conclusion that plea bargaining routinely brings about wrongful 
convictions, they reach diametrically opposing views regarding the 
desirability of the practice. Many commentators find that plea 
bargaining is problematic and argue for its curtailment because of this 
“innocence problem.”11 Other scholars favor the practice, contending 
that plea bargaining can only benefit those innocents who prefer the 
discounted bargain to the risk of a much harsher sentence following a 
wrongful conviction at trial.12 
 
 10. For a thorough review of the law-and-economics literature on plea bargaining, see 
Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea-Bargaining and Prosecution, in 3 CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 145 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009). For some of the more prominent articles, see 
sources cited supra note 4. 
 11. Professor Albert Alschuler has noted that many plea-bargaining advocates  
[A]pparently perceive no difference between, on the one hand, a system in which 
each of ten innocent but risk-averse defendants senses a ten percent chance of 
conviction at trial and accepts a sentence of one year and, on the other hand, a system 
in which nine innocent defendants are acquitted at trial while one, wrongly convicted, 
is sentenced to ten years. In both situations . . . the legal system has yielded the same 
number of years of unwarranted imprisonment. There may, however, be a difference 
between these situations apart from the greater number of wrongful convictions 
produced by a system of plea bargaining—the difference between a criminal-justice 
system that tries to find the truth and sometimes fails and one that apparently does 
not care. 
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 713–14 
(1981); see also Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 98–99 
(1976) (comparing a prosecutor’s plea offer to coercing someone to act at gunpoint); Langbein, 
supra note 4, 12–13 (likening plea bargaining to medieval torture and observing that “[w]e 
coerce the accused against whom we find probable cause to confess his guilt” by “threaten[ing] 
him with a materially increased sanction if he avails himself of his right [to trial] and is 
thereafter convicted”); Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1981–91 (rejecting Scott and Stuntz’s 
bargain-theory conception of the “innocence problem,” Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, but 
highlighting other problems with plea bargaining (internal quotation marks omitted)); Welsh S. 
White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 450–51 
(1971) (“Prosecutorial inducement of guilty pleas in weak cases . . . poses potentially serious 
problems.”); Wright, supra note 4, at 113 (“A trial distortion theory does not imply that there is 
a particular level of acquittals that is healthy or unhealthy; acquittals become a point of concern 
not simply when they become too high or low in absolute terms, but also when they change 
persistently in one direction.”). 
 12. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA L. REV. 1117, 1170–78 (2007) 
(“[T]here exists a marked disconnect between systemic fact and hollow ideals when it comes to 
guilt and innocence. . . . [T]here is no good reason to act in deference to empty principles that 
ignore the realities of punishment and serve no practical purposes other than compelling the 
undeserved innocent accused to bear unwelcome process or trial-penalty risk.”); Thomas W. 
Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 516 (1979) (“The 
problem with the case against plea bargaining from the perspective of the factually innocent 
defendant is that the critics seem to assume that such blameless defendants are necessarily 
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This Article reveals, however, that the prevailing scholarly views 
on culpability and plea bargaining are mistaken. Instead, the 
empirical evidence that we present reveals a distinct, yet hitherto 
neglected,13 “innocence effect” in plea bargaining, in which culpability 
exerts a strong influence on defendants’ willingness to accept plea 
offers and, consequently, on overall plea-bargaining and conviction 
rates. Specifically, defedants who exhibit the innocence effect tend to 
reject plea offers that similarly situated guilty defendants typically 
accept, showing that the pervasive shadow-of-trial assumption that 
culpability is irrelevant is plainly wrong. Moreover, our evidence on 
the significant effect of innocence on plea behavior demonstrates that 
scholars’ related, common belief that plea bargains lead innocents 
routinely to make false guilty pleas is overstated. 
Although we are not the first to criticize the standard, dominant 
shadow-of-trial approach in the criminal arena, our analysis and its 
policy implications differ substantially from extant approaches. One 
of the main criticisms of the shadow-of-trial model is that defendants’ 
decisions are too erratic to predict their bargaining strategies because 
defendants are irrational, lack the capacity to make calculated 
decisions, or suffer from inadequate legal representation.14 This 
critique, however, relies mainly on intuition and anecdotes, not on 
 
exonerated at trial.”); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 320 (“Sometimes the evidence may point to 
guilt despite the defendant’s factual innocence. It would do defendants no favor to prevent them 
from striking the best deals they could in such sorry circumstances.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 
4, at 1947 (“Bargaining defendants are, in effect, purchasing insurance from prosecutors, 
insurance against the risk of conviction and a high post-trial sentence.”). 
 13. We were able to find only two psychological studies, one from the late 1970s and the 
other from the early 1980s, that examined the influence of innocence in plea bargaining. See 
Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened Punishment, and 
Assumed Role on Mock Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 59 
(1984) (analyzing “the decision strategy used by defendants in a plea bargaining situation” 
through a role-playing experiment); W. Larry Gregory, John C. Mowen & Darwyn E. Linder, 
Social Psychology and Plea Bargaining: Applications, Methodology, and Theory, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1521 (1978) (employing role-playing and involved-participant 
procedures “to identify variables that affect the acceptance of a plea bargain”). These earlier 
studies are discussed in Parts I.D and II.C infra. 
 14. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 11, at 664 (stating that excessive optimism leads 
defendants to make wrong decisions); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1219–22 (1975) (examining how defense attorneys’ biases and 
rapport with prosecutors can affect outcomes for defendants); Bibas, supra note 3, at 2476–86 
(arguing that defense attorneys may lead defendants to make wrong choices in the plea-
bargaining process); id. at 2496–2519 (arguing that defendants’ biases lead them to make choices 
that diverge from the predictions of the shadow-of-trial model); Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 53–
60 (discussing the effects of the personal interests of defense attorneys); Schulhofer, supra note 
6, at 1988–90 (same). 
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quantitative empirical studies,15 and it is at least partly contradicted by 
our empirical evidence of the innocence effect, which reveals 
innocents’ systematic reluctance to plea. At any rate, the common 
criticisms of the shadow-of-trial approach bear very different 
normative implications from those that follow from our findings. 
More recently, commentators have sought to challenge the 
shadow-of-trial approach by applying psychological insights to 
defendants’ plea behaviors.16 Although commendable in their efforts 
to increase the realism and efficacy of plea-bargaining scholarship, 
these challenges are nonetheless of mixed quality, lacking direct 
evidence of plea behavior and occasionally manifesting a limited 
familiarity with the precise contours of the psychological evidence.17 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, none of these behaviorally informed 
contributions have identified the innocence effect. 
In a similar vein, the extensive research on procedural fairness 
reveals limitations of the shadow-of-trial model besides those that we 
examine here.18 Procedural-fairness studies show that defendants’ 
satisfaction with the criminal process, as well as the public’s 
willingness to accept its legitimacy more generally, depend not only 
 
 15. For example, one leading critic of the shadow-of-trial model based his findings on 
unstructured talks with court participants, a methodology he called “legal journalism.” 
Alschuler, supra note 14, at 1181; Alschuler, supra note 3, at 52.  
 16. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2467 (“[T]he shadow-of-trial model assumes that the actors 
are fundamentally rational. Recent scholarship on negotiation and behavioral law and 
economics, however, undercuts this strong assumption of rationality. Instead, overconfidence, 
self-serving biases, framing, denial mechanisms, anchoring, discount rates, and risk preferences 
all skew bargains.”); see also Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 205 (“This Article proposes and examines four hypotheses that attempt to 
reconcile the rate of guilty pleas and the [cognitive-psychology] principle of loss aversion.”); 
Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213 (2007) (examining “why plea bargaining is so prevalent 
notwithstanding the existence of plea-discouraging cognitive bias”); Rebecca Hollander-
Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 
163 (2007) (“This essay begins to explore psychological research on how motivation and the 
effects of social factors can affect information processing to shed light on such processing in the 
plea bargaining setting.”).  
 17. For example, Professor Stephanos Bibas argues that “[p]rosecutorial bluffing is likely 
to work particularly well against innocent defendants, who are on average more risk averse than 
guilty defendants.” Bibas, supra note 3, at 2495. We find significant evidence to the contrary, 
however. Cf. Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. 
REV. 237, 275–81 (2008) (discussing the value and limitations of theoretical applications of 
extra-legal behavioral evidence to the law). 
 18. For review of this literature by one of its most important contributors, see generally 
Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117 (2000). 
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on the results of the process but also on its perceived fairness.19 Our 
inquiry is distinct from the procedural-fairness literature in three 
respects, however. First, we focus on the ultimate plea offer and its 
acceptance or rejection instead of on the process that generates the 
offer. Second, our analysis examines not only defendants’ perceptions 
but also their actual plea behavior. Third, and significantly, our 
findings reveal a phenomenon that systematically distinguishes the 
innocent from the guilty, beyond the various behavioral factors—
procedural-fairness concerns included—that similarly affect all 
defendants. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews a diverse body 
of evidence for the innocence effect, including retrospective studies of 
convicts, empirical analyses of field data on wrongfully convicted 
defendants who were later exonerated, and controlled experimental 
studies of plea behavior. Part II then examines the causes of the 
innocence effect. It considers alternative accounts for our field data, 
explores the psychological antecedents of the effect by drawing on 
relevant behavioral research in other domains, and supplements this 
broader research with more specific findings from experimental tests 
of plea bargaining. 
Part III develops the positive and normative implications of the 
innocence effect and its psychological antecedents. Positively, we 
reveal the counterintuitive, striking cost of innocence: innocent 
defendants suffer harsher average sanctions than their similarly 
situated guilty counterparts. At the same time, however, our findings 
also show that the innocence effect causes the overrepresentation of 
the guilty among plea bargainers and of the innocent among those 
choosing trial, with the beneficial consequence of reducing the overall 
rate of wrongful convictions. 
Normatively, Part III shows that plea-bargaining opponents and 
proponents alike must reevaluate, if not wholly reverse, their 
traditional positions. Specifically, proponents argue that plea 
bargaining can only benefit innocents, providing them with an option 
to avoid the risk of wrongful conviction at trial and the “trial 
penalty”—that is, the excess sentence imposed on convicted 
defendants who had selected trials instead of pleading guilty.20 Yet we 
show that the innocence effect makes guilty defendants the main 
 
 19. See id. at 119–20 (discussing the many ways in which procedural fairness affects 
acceptance of a decision, in both criminal cases and other legal processes). 
 20. See supra note 12. 
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beneficiaries of large plea discounts, which leaves innocents—who 
disproportionately go to trial—to suffer the heavy trial penalty if they 
are wrongfully convicted. Assuming that the interests of innocent 
defendants are the relevant normative yardstick, therefore, plea 
bargaining should be opposed rather than supported. 
Plea-bargaining opponents, on the other hand, emphasize the 
need to reduce the rate of wrongful convictions. They argue that plea 
bargaining should be curtailed because it leads innocent defendants 
to plead guilty, thereby causing a miscarriage of justice.21 We find, 
however, that guilty defendants overwhelmingly plead guilty 
following a plea bargain, whereas some of those innocents who 
disproportionately choose to stand trial due to the innocence effect 
are acquitted. Therefore, if the rate of wrongful conviction is the 
relevant yardstick, plea bargaining should be encouraged, not 
discouraged. 
Finally, in view of the paradoxical normative implications of the 
innocence effect, Part III concludes with two proposals of our own for 
minimizing false convictions, better protecting the innocent, and 
improving the plea bargaining process altogether by accounting for 
the innocence effect. 
I.  EVIDENCE 
A diverse body of evidence substantiates the intuitive, if 
neglected, innocence effect.  Part I.A opens with a brief review of 
suggestive retrospective studies in which defendants report that 
culpability played a central role in their plea decisions. An empirical 
analysis of field data from several hundred wrongfully convicted 
defendants who were later exonerated, predominantly in rape and 
murder cases, follows in Part I.B. This analysis reveals that only a 
small fraction of the wrongful convictions for these severe offenses 
followed guilty pleas, in sharp contrast to rape and murder 
convictions more generally, which typically result from such pleas. 
Part I.C then examines closely the case of the thirty-eight innocent 
Tulia defendants, who were convicted for drug trafficking and later 
exonerated. The Tulia events, of which we have detailed information, 
again show a striking contrast between the reluctance of innocent 
defendants to plea bargain and the statistics in comparable criminal 
 
 21. See Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1984–85 (“I argue for an old-fashioned conception of 
what the ‘innocence problem’ is, and for an old-fashioned kind of remedy—abolition of 
bargaining—to solve it.”); supra note 11. 
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cases in similar Texas districts. Finally, Part I.D concludes with 
evidence of the innocence effect from controlled experiments that 
directly manipulated the culpability of participants in both 
hypothetical scenarios and more realistic simulations. 
A. Post-Plea Interviews 
The major challenge facing an attempt to adduce quantitative 
evidence of the innocence effect is the difficulty of identifying truly 
innocent defendants. Guilty defendants often will proclaim their 
innocence, seeking to avoid conviction or obtain a better plea 
bargain, whereas innocents may plea bargain when conviction seems 
certain and the plea offer appears attractive. Similarly, one cannot 
infer the innocence of those few who choose trial from their refusal to 
plea bargain. Some guilty defendants may refuse to bargain, whether 
in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a better offer, because their plea 
offers were not sufficiently attractive, or to avoid the social costs of 
admitting their guilt in court. Finally, criminal trials cannot perfectly 
separate the guilty from the innocent, which inevitably results in cases 
both of mistaken acquittals and of wrongful convictions. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies collecting data from defendants 
after the conclusion of their criminal proceedings reveal the centrality 
of culpability and innocence in defendants’ plea behavior. Although 
these retrospective interviews may be tainted by the participating 
convicts’ efforts to present themselves in a positive light, they are less 
likely than pretrial data to be shaped by defendants’ attempts to 
impact the legal result of their already-concluded case. 
Interestingly, retrospective studies report that the expected- 
sanction considerations on which the shadow-of-trial model is based22 
are not the most important factors for defendants’ plea-bargain 
decisions. Instead, and quite strikingly, many defendants claimed that 
they had pleaded guilty first and foremost because they were in fact 
guilty.23 In the same vein, almost all convicted defendants who 
 
 22. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 23. A.E. BOTTOMS & J.D. MCCLEAN, DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 111–12 & 
tbl.5.7 (1976). Of the defendants in the sample who pleaded guilty, 41 percent explained that 
they did so simply because they were guilty, 27 percent pleaded guilty because the police had a 
good case against them, 20 percent because they were caught red-handed, 11 percent because 
they confessed to the police, 10 percent to end the matter quietly and with less fuss, and 7 
percent based on their lawyer’s advice. Only 5 percent said they plea bargained to get a lighter 
sentence. Some defendants gave more than one reason. Id. at 112 tbl.5.7; see also SUSANNE 
DELL, SILENT IN COURT: THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN WHO WENT TO PRISON 
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pleaded “not guilty” at trial claimed either that they did not commit 
the offense or that, in their opinion, the act that they had committed 
did not constitute an offense.24 Utilitarian considerations, on the other 
hand, were far less common: only 10 percent of the defendants cited 
the desire to end the proceedings quickly as a major reason for plea 
bargaining, and merely 5 percent cited the desire to obtain a lighter 
sanction through the plea as the main reason for accepting a plea 
bargain.25 In many cases, moreover, defendants who pleaded “not 
guilty” told the researchers that had they based their decision on 
considerations of expediency, they would have plea bargained rather 
than gone to trial.26 
Notably, most defendants in retrospective studies had no 
problem presenting themselves in a negative light. That is, the vast 
majority of guilty pleaders—which is to say the substantial majority of 
all defendants27—routinely admitted in the survey that they had 
committed the offense and even stated that their culpability was the 
main reason for their guilty plea.28 
Therefore, although the veracity of retrospective claims of 
innocence in post-trial or post-plea surveys may be questionable, 
these studies can at least be cited for the proposition that, for most 
 
30–37 (1971) (only about 10 percent of the women who pleaded guilty denied committing the 
offense when interviewed after pleading). 
 24. See BOTTOMS & MCCLEAN, supra note 23, at 130–31. 
 25. See id. at 112 tbl.5.7. 
 26. See id. at 132 (“[A] decision to plead not guilty did not imply the expectation of 
acquittal: 26 per cent of those convicted and 21 per cent of those acquitted had expected to be 
found guilty.”). For a more detailed analysis of this study, see supra note 23. Similar results were 
found in an international study that interviewed nearly four hundred defendants immediately 
following their plea at the Israeli Magistrate Court. AMI KOBO, INCONSISTENT PLEADERS IN 
COURT: PLEADING GUILTY AND CLAIMING TO BE INNOCENT 329–43 (2009). In that study, 
most defendants who pleaded guilty (53 percent) reported making their decision to reject the 
plea offer either because the indictment that was brought against them was justified or because 
they had committed the offense. Only a few defendants who pleaded guilty mentioned 
expediency considerations, such as the desire to end the case (10.2 percent), or the deal offered 
by a plea bargain, or an expected penalty relief following a guilty plea (11.2 percent). Another 
common reason given was being caught red-handed (23.7 percent). Of course, defendants’ 
responses in the latter study, which were collected before trial concluded, are particularly 
susceptible to the criticism that they are distorted or false because defendants might seek to 
somehow affect the outcome of the case even while talking privately to researchers outside the 
legal proceeding.  
 27. See supra note 1. 
 28. See supra notes 23, 26.  
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defendants who pleaded guilty, culpability was a significant 
consideration in making that plea decision.29 
B. Exoneration Statistics 
Suggestive retrospective studies notwithstanding, we sought to 
obtain direct, quantitative evidence of the innocence effect. To 
overcome the challenge of identifying truly innocent defendants, we 
turned to the one group whose innocence is nearly certain: 
defendants who were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated. 
Using data from the Innocence Project30 and data collected by 
Professor Samuel Gross and his coauthors,31 we compiled a dataset of 
466 exoneration cases in which a conviction was overturned based on 
new information that revealed that the defendant was factually 
innocent.32 Of those cases, 284 exonerations resulted from DNA 
 
 29. A similar pattern of a strong concern for fairness or justice emerges from the cases 
featured in the PBS documentary The Plea, which chronicled individuals who refused to plead 
guilty and claimed their innocence despite certain incarceration and extremely attractive plea 
offers. Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea. Such was the story of Kelly Jarrett, who rejected an offer to 
plead guilty and be set free after having already served about ten years of her sentence of 
twenty-five years to life. Jarrett refused the offer on moral grounds, despite knowing that she 
was very likely to serve decades more in prison because of this refusal. Similarly, Kerry Max 
Cook was twice convicted and sentenced to death for the murder and mutilation of a woman. 
When the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—the highest criminal appeals court in the state—
ordered the lower court to review the case again, the prosecutor offered Cook the chance to 
plead guilty in exchange for his immediate release. Despite the risk of another possible death 
sentence, Cook refused to plead guilty to a murder he did not commit. It was only after he had 
been offered a nolo contendere settlement, which allowed him to maintain his assertion of 
innocence, that he accepted the deal that set him free. Two months after the plea bargain, a 
DNA test proved that someone else had committed the crime and that Cook, therefore, was 
innocent. Id. 
 30. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
 31. Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata 
Patil, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 
(2005). 
 32. Originally, we included cases from many other sources, including data from EDWIN 
BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (1932); JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK IN ASSOCIATION WITH HAROLD M. 
HOFFMAN, NOT GUILTY (1957); MICHAEL L. RADELET, HUGO ADAM BEDAU & CONSTANCE 
E. PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992); 
EDWARD D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS (2d prtg. 1964); CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NW. 
L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc (last visited Sept. 22, 2012); INNOCENCE PROJECT 
NEW ORLEANS, http://ip-no.org/exonerees-clients (last visited Sept. 22, 2012); JUSTICE DENIED: 
MAG. FOR WRONGLY CONVICTED, http://www.justicedenied.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2012); 
TRUTH IN JUSTICE, http://www.truthinjustice.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2012); and Wrongly 
Convicted Database Index, FOREJUSTICE, http://forejustice.org/db/innocents.html (last visited 
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analysis, and the real offender was found in 96 cases. To ensure data 
quality and relevance we used only exonerations from 1989 through 
June 2011.33 The records in the database were categorized for the 
following seven variables: type of felony (mostly rape or murder), 
year of wrongful conviction, year of exoneration, sentence, type of 
conviction (plea or trial), cause of mistaken conviction,34 and type of 
exonerating evidence.35 In cases in which defendants pleaded guilty, 
we also added an eighth variable, measuring whether they faced the 
threat of a death sentence if convicted at trial. 
The quantitative evidence of the innocence effect was dramatic. 
The categorized data revealed that only 37 of the 466 exonerated 
defendants, or 7.9 percent, were convicted following a guilty plea. The 
remaining 92.1 percent were convicted by an erroneous jury decision 
at trial. This 7.9 percent rate stands in sharp contrast to the common 
rate of guilty pleas in comparable felony cases during the same 
period, which was approximately 90 percent.36 
 
Sept. 22, 2012). To assure a high, consistent standard for inclusion in the database and to ensure 
that the cases included are not too old, however, we relied only on data from the INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, supra note 30, and Gross et al., supra note 31. We consulted the other sources for 
supplementary information regarding the cases that we studied. Seven cases in Gross et al., 
supra note 31, were excluded from our analysis because of insufficient information. 
 33. Relying on more recent cases reduces the risk that the result is affected by changes in 
the criminal-justice system over the years. We note, however, that a larger dataset that also 
included older cases generated results similar to those reported here.  
 34. The causes were eyewitness misidentification (269 cases), expert testimony (60 cases), 
police misconduct (77 cases), prosecution misconduct (76 cases), false confessions (67 cases), 
false testimony of an informant or another interested party (89 cases), ineffective or no 
representation (30 cases), alleged scientific evidence (37 cases), alleged suspicious statement of 
the defendant (12 cases),  and pre-DNA hair analysis (27 cases). In many cases, more than one 
cause led to the miscarriage of justice. 
 35. The exonerating evidence consisted of DNA (284 cases), real culprit found (96 cases), 
solid alibi proved (10 cases), informant reversed testimony (34 cases), and exonerating scientific 
evidence other than DNA—such as blood tests, fingerprints, and ballistic tests (13 cases). Three 
exonerations followed proof that the crime never happened. In one case, the supposedly stolen 
money was found. In another, a couple was exonerated from murdering their baby, who had 
never been born. In some cases, more than one type of proof led to the exoneration. 
 36. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
205289, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990-2002: VIOLENT FELONS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES, 7 tbl.13 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vfluc.pdf 
(stating that 88 percent of violent felony convictions in the seventy-five largest urban counties 
between 1990 and 2002 resulted from guilty pleas). In 1996, 91 percent of state-court felony 
convictions followed guilty pleas. JODI M. BROWN, PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 173939, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE COURTS, 1996, at 1 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
fssc96.pdf. A decade later, the number had increased to 94 percent. SEAN ROSENMERKEL, 
MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
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Intriguingly, many of the innocent defendants in our database 
who pleaded guilty to a crime that they did not commit—23 of 67 
wrongfully convicted defendants, or 34.3 percent—did so after falsely 
confessing to the crime during the police investigation. This result 
suggests that guilty pleas following a confession are less reliable than 
guilty pleas generally.37 Moreover, the finding demonstrates that the 
innocence effect is even stronger when the innocent defendant had 
not falsely confessed to the crime during investigation. Only 14 
defendants of the 399 exonerees who had not confessed during the 
police investigation, 3.5 percent, pled guilty.38 
To get a more nuanced perspective, we also analyzed each of the 
common offenses in the database separately. Among the 196 sexual 
assault exonerations, only 11, or 5.6 percent, followed a guilty plea—a 
figure that is dramatically different from the approximately 85 
percent guilty-plea rate among sexual assault convictions during that 
period.39 Among murder and manslaughter cases, 16 of the 234 
exonerated defendants, 6.8 percent, pled guilty, dramatically less than 
the 60 percent guilty-plea rate among comparable convictions.40 
Moreover, 14 of these 16 defendants explained that their guilty plea 
had been driven by their fear of capital punishment. Unsurprisingly, it 
appears that even innocents are likely to plead guilty when bargaining 
is conducted in the shadow of a death sentence. 
One possible concern is that the exoneration data does not 
reveal whether, in light of the prosecution’s evidence, the plea offers 
would have been unattractive even to guilty defendants. We believe 
 
JUSTICE, NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006, at 1 (2009), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. In fact, the 99 percent confidence interval 
around the 7.9 percent rate in our sample data has a lower bound of 5.6 percent and an upper 
bound of 13.4 percent, which highlights the strong tendency of these innocents to opt for a trial. 
 37. Notably, this important finding does not show that false confessions cause false guilty 
pleas. Instead, our data reveal an important correlation between the two behaviors, leaving 
open the possibility that some other case characteristic––such as extreme vulnerability of certain 
defendants––facilitates both false confessions and false pleading. Although we speculate that 
both of the preceding accounts may be true, further empirical investigation in this area is 
necessary. 
 38. The 99 percent confidence interval around the 2.8 percent rate in this sample data has a 
lower bound of 1.8 percent and an upper bound of 7.2 percent. 
 39. In 1996, 81 percent of the convictions in sexual assault cases resulted from guilty pleas. 
BROWN ET AL., supra note 36, at 8 tbl.10. In 2006, it was 88 percent. ROSENMERKEL ET AL., 
supra note 36, at 25 tbl.4.1. 
 40. In 1996, 54 percent of the convictions for murder and non-negligent manslaughter 
resulted from guilty pleas. BROWN ET AL., supra note 36, at 7. In 2006, the rate was 61 percent. 
ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 25 tbl.4.1. 
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that this concern is of little significance, however, as there is no 
reason to believe that prosecutors treated these innocent defendants 
differently from their treatment of similar, guilty defendants. 
Prosecutors probably believe that all prosecuted defendants are guilty 
and dismiss the charges against those who they believe are innocent. 
Therefore, prosecutors usually offer defendants plea bargains that 
reflect the expected sanction at trial, irrespective of defendants’ 
actual guilt or innocence.41 Absent an innocence effect, therefore, we 
should have observed similar guilty-plea rates for guilty and innocent 
defendants. 
Another, potentially more significant, concern with the 
systematic, pronounced differences between the defendants in our 
database and the general convict population is that the exonerated 
may consist of a small, self-selected—and therefore non-
representative—group of innocents who refuse even attractive offers 
and persist in making efforts to prove their innocence following 
conviction. According to this account, the behavior of the exonerated 
may systematically differ from that of the broader population of 
innocent defendants, who accept attractive plea offers, do not seek to 
challenge their convictions after pleading guilty, and thus are unlikely 
to be exonerated.42  
To examine this possibility, we separately studied the subset of 
cases in which the defendants were exonerated after the real offender 
had been identified, the type of event that was less likely to depend 
on defendants’ efforts to challenge their convictions. Among those 
ninety-six cases, only twelve convictions, 12.5 percent, resulted from 
guilty pleas. 
 
 41. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 297 (“As the sentence on conviction and the 
probability of conviction rise, so does the prosecutor’s minimum demand.”); Schulhofer, supra 
note 6, at 1984 (“Offers and reservation prices depend on the likelihood of conviction, which, in 
turn, is governed primarily by the admissible evidence available to the prosecution and 
defense. . . . Innocence by itself (that is, apart from its link to particular evidence) can have only 
a small impact on the odds of conviction.”); see also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 52 (“[T]he 
prosecutor must estimate the sentence that seems likely after a conviction at trial, discount this 
sentence by the possibility of an acquittal, and balance the ‘discounted trial sentence’ against the 
sentence he can insure through a plea agreement.”); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea 
Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2298–99 (2006) (discussing the impact of plea bargaining 
on a prosecutor’s decision whether to prosecute a case at all). 
 42. See C. RONALD HUFF, ARYE RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT 
INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 73 (1996) (arguing that usually, 
when wrongful convictions result from a guilty plea “there is no continued aftermath, no 
investigation, no exoneration”). 
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Because it is conceivable that even this subset of exonerations 
still partly reflects the contribution of plea-refusing innocents’ efforts, 
however, we sought those rare instances in which this selection effect 
is particularly unlikely. For this purpose, we examined a broader 
exonerations dataset, spanning from the beginning of the twentieth 
century through June 2011,43 which included seven murder defendants 
who had been exonerated after the supposed murder victim was 
found to be alive.44 In one additional theft case, the defendant had 
been exonerated after the supposedly stolen money was found.45 Each 
of these eight defendants—whose efforts could not have contributed 
to the exoneration—pleaded not guilty,46 providing a further 
illustration of the innocence effect. 
Beyond its apparently limited manifestation in our exoneration 
dataset, moreover, the selection-bias argument fails to account for the 
remarkable reluctance to plea bargain that was exhibited by the Tulia 
defendants, whose exonerations resulted from no effort of their own. 
C. The Tulia Dataset 
Another dataset that shows the innocence effect at work 
concerns the criminal prosecution, conviction, and later exoneration 
of a large group of defendants in the small town of Tulia, Texas. This 
dataset is particularly instructive for a number of reasons. First, it 
involves drug-trafficking cases, thereby expanding the range of 
offenses covered by our other exoneration data, which otherwise 
consist almost solely of murder and rape cases. Second, the 
quantitative data we have for the thirty-eight Tulia defendants is 
further complemented by rich, qualitative documentation of these 
innocents’ plea-bargain decision-making processes. Third, and 
importantly, the effects of selection bias—which could not be ruled 
out completely with respect to our general exoneration data 
 
 43. Because the cases in our database included no exonerations resulting from the 
appearance of the supposed murder victim, we examined here the larger database of 973 cases 
from the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries that we compiled originally. See supra note 32.  
 44. These include the cases of Bill Wilson, Alabama, 1915; Louise Butler and George 
Yelder, Alabama, 1928; Antonio Rivera and Merla Walpole, California, 1973; Condy Dabney, 
Kentucky, 1926; and Ernest Lyons, Virginia, 1909. Exonerations in All States, CTR. ON 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NW. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/ 
exonerations/usIndex.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). The full story of Ernest Lyons can be 
found in BORCHARD, supra note 32, at 144–48.  
 45. Gross et al., supra note 31, at 536 n.28. 
 46. Exonerations in All States, supra note 44. 
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presented in Part I.B—are absent from the Tulia cases because we 
know that the defendants’ efforts played no role in their later 
exonerations.47 
The Tulia cases took place when one corrupt, undercover police 
officer successfully framed thirty-eight people in allegedly 
independent cases of drug trafficking.48 A few years after their 
respective convictions, however, these innocents were exonerated and 
compensated, and the officer was convicted of perjury.49 The behavior 
of these unrelated, innocent defendants, who each knew that a police 
officer would testify at trial that he or she sold him cocaine, is telling.50 
The first eight defendants, who were brought to trial consecutively, 
were unwilling to plea bargain. They were sentenced after jury trials 
to various prison terms, ranging from 20 to 434 years of 
imprisonment.51 
Among the eight defendants was Joe Moore, who rejected his 
lawyer’s repeated advice to plea bargain, even though he was told he 
would not be able to challenge the officer’s testimony at trial.52 With 
two previous drug offences in his record, no alibi, and only his word 
against that of a police officer, Moore’s defense lawyer was correct to 
tell him that he had no chance at trial.53 Following his refusal to plea 
bargain, Moore was convicted after a trial that lasted less than a day 
and was sentenced to ninety-nine years of imprisonment.54 
 
 47. See Texas “Officer of the Year” Chalked Up 38 Wrongful Convictions, CTR. ON 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NW. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc/ exonerations/ 
txtuliasummary.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (explaining that the reinvestigation of the case 
was the result of efforts by a Texas Observer reporter whose stories were brought to the 
attention of an NAACP lawyer, who then assembled a legal team to represent the imprisoned 
Tulia defendants, which ultimately resulted in the defendants’ exoneration). Many of the details 
of the Tulia scandal are taken from NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND 
CORRUPTION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN (2005).  
 48. Texas “Officer of the Year” Chalked Up 38 Wrongful Convictions, supra note 47. 
 49. BLAKESLEE, supra note 47, at 408. 
 50. See id. at 77 (reporting that the results of the first trial “spread quickly among the small 
pool of lawyers who handled indigent defendants’ cases in Swisher County”). 
 51. See id. at 43–157 (describing the pleas and sentences of the first eight Tulia defendants). 
For a summary of the Tulia cases, see Texas “Officer of the Year” Chalked Up 38 Wrongful 
Convictions, supra note 47. 
 52. BLAKESLEE, supra note 47, at 48. 
 53. Id. at 44–48. 
 54. Id. at 57–59. Moore was frustrated by his lawyer’s lack of trust and asked to dismiss 
him, but the court rejected this request as well as another request for a continuance to examine 
the officer’s credibility. Id. at 48. Even after Moore’s requests were rejected, however, he still 
refused to accept plea offers. Id. 
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Similarly, Fred Brookins knew that all five defendants whose 
trials preceded his own had been convicted based on similar 
testimony by the same officer who was about to testify against him.55 
Brookins nevertheless rejected a deal for five years of imprisonment 
on the eve of the trial, against his lawyer’s strong advice, arguing that 
he should not plead guilty to something that he had not done. 
Following his plea refusal, he received a twenty-year sentence at 
trial.56 
The eight Tulia defendants’ consistent and independent refusals 
to plea bargain not only demonstrate the reluctance of some 
innocents to plea, but also suggest that such reluctance may be quite 
common, even in cases such as these—that is, with defendants facing 
strong incriminating evidence, high trial risk, and the contrary advice 
of their defense lawyers. In a state where only 0.5 percent of 
defendants in drug-related offenses opted for a jury trial in 1999, 
these eight defendants made the exceptional decision to reject a plea 
offer and face a jury.57 It is particularly striking that the latter of the 
first eight innocents refused to plea bargain despite seeing how 
virtually identical testimony led to extremely harsh prison sentences 
for those who preceded them, in the same courtroom, and with the 
same two judges.58 
The Tulia cases also illustrate that innocents’ reluctance to plea 
bargain is not without limit. Following the harsh sentences that were 
imposed on the first eight defendants, only three of the remaining 
defendants went to trial; the other twenty-seven innocents pled guilty, 
many of them in return for very attractive nonincarceration 
sentences.59 Thus, at least when the plea concession is great and the 
 
 55. Id. at 148. 
 56. Id. at 157. 
 57. In Texas in 1999, only 74 of the 24,570 convictions (0.3 percent) in drug offenses in 
county courts took place in front of a jury. Another 105 convictions (0.4 percent) resulted from 
nonjury trial, and the remaining 99.2 percent of these convictions followed guilty pleas. 147 
defendants were acquitted. 81 in non-jury trials and only 51 in jury trials, with an additional 15 
receiving a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Therefore, 125 of 24,837 
defendants overall (0.5 percent) opted for a trial by jury. 1999 Annual Report, Statewide 
Summary of Reported Activity: Criminal, Probate, and Mental Health, TEX. COURT ONLINE, 
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/AR99/county/cosum99.xlw (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) 
(recording statewide criminal-justice activity for the year ending August 31, 1999). 
 58. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 47, at 77–157 (describing the pleas and sentences of the 
first eight Tulia defendants).  
 59. Lee Hockstader, Texas To Toss Drug Convictions Against 38 People, Prosecutor 
Concedes “Travesty of Justice,” WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at A03; see also BLAKESLEE, supra 
note 47, at 160–61 (summarizing the pleas of the Tulia defendants). 
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extremely high likelihood of conviction at trial is undeniable, even 
innocents commonly will plea bargain. Notably, however, the overall 
trial rate of the Tulia innocents was still 29 percent, with eleven of 
thirty-eight defendants refusing to plea bargain, a dramatically higher 
rate than the 0.5 percent rate for comparable offenses in Texas noted 
in the previous paragraph.60 
The Tulia dataset reveals a strong innocence effect for offenses 
that, although less severe than those murder and rape cases in our 
larger exoneration database, still carry extended incarceration 
sentences. The evidence also indicates that the first eight defendants’ 
refusal to plea bargain was significantly motivated by fairness 
concerns.61 Furthermore, the Tulia cases show the innocence effect 
among defendants who did not initiate the efforts that led to their 
later exoneration.62 
Taken together, our varied sources of field data paint a picture in 
which considerations of culpability matter to criminal defendants, and 
in which innocents in particular are reluctant to accept plea offers 
except in some limited circumstances—namely, when innocents 
recognize that conviction is very likely, when the plea concession is 
great, when they believe that they are facing the risk of death 
sentence, or when they had falsely confessed during investigation. 
Although the shadow-of-trial model predicts otherwise,63 defendants’ 
culpability shapes their behavior not only indirectly by influencing 
their probability of conviction and expected sentence, but also 
directly by impacting their willingness to accept plea offers. 
Nevertheless, both our general exoneration evidence and the 
Tulia dataset concern only serious offenses—ones with long 
incarceration sentences that leave sufficient time for an exoneration 
to occur. These offenses may not represent the behavior of criminal 
defendants in less serious cases in which exoneration evidence is 
unavailable. To provide further support for the prevalence of the 
innocence effect and evidence of its generality, we turn to two early 
experimental studies that examined plea-bargaining behavior through 
controlled experiments. 
 
 60. See supra note 57.  
 61. See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.  
 62. See supra note 47.  
 63. See supra note 6. 
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D. Experimental Evidence 
After offering in the preceding sections both quantitative and 
anecdotal evidence from the field for the innocence effect, we now 
consider two early experimental studies of plea behavior. Such studies 
are particularly suited to offer direct evidence for a causal 
relationship between innocence and the reluctance to plea.64 By 
allowing researchers to manipulate participants’ culpability and 
examine its effects on the willingness to plea bargain, these 
experiments provide evidence that the data from the field—where 
culpability is predetermined—cannot provide. Although field 
evidence may show a dramatic, negative correlation between 
innocence and the willingness to plea, experimental tests can help to 
reveal whether innocence is an actual cause of this effect. 
Experimental tests permit researchers to manipulate a particular 
variable—such as culpability—and examine its effects in a controlled 
environment.65 Despite their unique benefits, however, controlled 
experiments, particularly when conducted in laboratory settings, also 
have some inherent limitations, most notably with respect to their 
external validity.66 Findings in laboratory settings may not generalize 
well to the real world when the experiment fails to replicate 
important elements of the question that the researcher aims to study. 
This failure can happen, for example, due to the artificial nature of 
many laboratory studies or because the experimental participants 
somehow differ systematically from the real-world individuals in 
whose behavior we are interested.67 
This concern about external validity seems particularly acute in 
the case of plea bargaining. For instance, the extreme consequences 
of criminal defendants’ decisions cannot fully be replicated in the 
laboratory. Moreover, there are serious ethical and practical 
problems involved in misleading experimental participants to believe 
that they are guilty of committing a criminal offense. And there is the 
possibility that criminal defendants are somehow different from the 
 
 64. See Tor, supra note 17, at 281–90 (discussing the virtues of empirical studies). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See ROBERT ROSENTHAL & RALPH L. ROSNOW, ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH: METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS 212 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that external 
validity refers to whether the results of an experiment generalize to the public at large); 
WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, EXPERIMENTAL AND 
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 38 (2002) (defining 
validity and threats to validity). 
 67. ROSENTHAL & ROSNOW, supra note 66, at 212; Tor, supra note 17, at 287. 
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general population from which studies draw their experimental 
participants.68 
A more careful analysis suggests, however, that the limitations of 
experimental tests of plea-bargaining behavior are less detrimental 
than they initially appear to be. First and importantly, we draw on the 
experimental findings described below to gain further insight into the 
innocence effect—of which we already have substantial real-world 
evidence—not to establish its very existence. In fact, the evidence of 
the effect in these experiments serves more to highlight the studies’ 
external validity—that is, that they replicate real plea bargaining 
behavior at least in this important respect—than to further 
corroborate our real-world evidence. 
Second, some experimental tests included elements showing that, 
specifically in the plea-bargaining setting, the results of hypothetical 
questionnaires bear close resemblance to those results obtained by 
realistic simulations.69 Additionally, the responses of college 
students—the most common participants in laboratory experiments—
to such questionnaires are largely similar to those of convicted 
criminals.70 
In two early experiments, Professor Gregory and his coauthors 
found that innocence affected participants’ willingness to accept plea 
offers.71 One study concerned a lighter criminal offense—armed 
robbery—than the ones appearing in our field data; the other study 
involved a non-criminal, academic infraction. Moreover, Gregory et 
al. not only employed a simulation (for the robbery scenario) but also 
studied the behavior of individuals who were misled to believe that 
they had committed an academic infraction. 
The first study asked male students to imagine that they were 
either innocent or guilty of having committed armed robbery.72 The 
students received highly detailed information on the circumstances 
 
 68. See Avishalom Tor, Oren Gazal-Ayal & Stephen M. Garcia, Fairness and the 
Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 103 (2010) 
(discussing these problems). 
 69. See generally Gregory et al., supra note 13 (describing consistent results between a 
study that used a hypothetical questionnaire and one that used a realistic simulation). 
 70. See Pauline Houlden, The Impact of Procedural Modifications on Evaluations of Plea 
Bargaining, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 267, 279 (finding roughly similar outcomes in the responses 
of student participants and inmate participants in a study of defendants’ preferences about 
procedural aspects of plea barganing). 
 71. See Gregory et al., supra note 13, 1525 (“The present data suggest that the innocence or 
guilt of a defendant is a very strong determinant of acceptance of a plea bargain.”). 
 72. Id. at 1522–23. 
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that led to their imagined arrest for committing the crime, the charges 
against them, their punishment if convicted, and the details of a plea 
bargain that they were offered. Although the plea offers were 
identical for all participants, the first three variables—culpability, 
number of charges, and prison sentence if convicted—were 
manipulated between subjects.73 This design ensured that the 
participants, who were randomly assigned to their respective 
experimental conditions, were not exposed to multiple versions of the 
simulation and thus could not know that the experimenters were 
studying, inter alia, the role of innocence (as opposed to any other 
variable) in plea bargaining. The results of this first study showed that 
innocent participants were significantly more likely than guilty ones 
to reject the plea offer.74 
In the second experiment, in which students were accused of 
having prior information about answers to a difficult test, the 
researchers employed a confederate to place students in their 
respective conditions of actual guilt or innocence.75 This realistic 
experiment corroborated the results of the hypothetical decisions 
made by participants in the simulation study and found that innocent 
participants were dramatically less likely than guilty participants to 
accept a plea-like compromise offer in lieu of facing judgment with 
higher potential penalties by an ethics committee.76 This pattern of 
behavior prevailed, although both the charges and the evidence 
against the two participant groups were identical.77 
The results of Gregory et al.’s two controlled experiments 
complement our field evidence. They indicate that in the plea-
bargaining domain hypothetical studies using students as participants 
and requiring “as if” behavior can possess external validity. In 
addition, these studies—as well as the multiple additional 
experiments we discuss in Part II.C—suggest that the innocence effect 
 
 73. Id. For a discussion of the differences between “within-subjects” and “between-
subjects” experimental designs, see ROSENTHAL & ROSNOW, supra note 66, at 170–192. 
 74. Gregory et al., supra note 13, at 1525. Interestingly, the study also found main effects 
for the other independent variables (for example, the number of charges and the severity of 
punishment) and an interaction between them. Id. These effects, however, appeared when 
analyzing guilty but not innocent participants, id., which further corroborates the dominance of 
fairness considerations in innocents’ decisions.  
 75. Id. at 1526. 
 76. Id. at 1528. 
 77. Id. The evidence against the participants consisted only of their alleged high grade on 
what was represented to be a very difficult examination. Id. 
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extends to lighter offenses and infractions beyond those severe 
offenses appearing in our field evidence. 
II.  CAUSES 
A diverse set of empirical findings reveals a pattern in which 
considerations of culpability appear to be paramount in defendants’ 
plea behavior generally, and in which innocents specifically exhibit a 
strong tendency to refuse plea offers.78 Yet explanations other than a 
genuine reluctance to plea may account for innocent defendants’ 
behavior. Innocents, for instance, may exhibit more frequent plea 
refusals simply because they face better acquittal prospects at trial 
compared to guilty defendants. 
Moreover, even if the innocence effect truly is driven by 
innocence per se instead of the various other factors that typically are 
associated with innocence, such as innocents’ often-superior trial 
prospects, the field evidence sheds only limited light on the precise 
mechanisms whereby innocence facilitates plea rejections. Innocents 
may refuse to plead guilty because of a preference for justice or 
fairness. These defendants may also spurn plea offers more often than 
guilty defendants due to innocents’ more optimistic predictions of 
their trial prospects,79 or for other reasons altogether.80 
As Part III explains, however, a better understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the innocence effect is important for plea-
bargaining policy. To this end, Part II.A first considers alternative 
accounts besides actual innocence for the innocence effect, 
concluding that these accounts cannot fully explain the empirical 
data. Part II.B then turns to the likely mechanisms underlying the 
effect, drawing on a rich psychological literature that studied similar 
 
 78. See supra Part I. 
 79. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 80. Cf. Colin Camerer & Eric Talley, Experimental Study of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 1619, 1621 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[E]mpirical 
approaches suffer from the fact that it is often difficult to stage (much less to observe by 
happenstance) a truly natural experiment in the real world that implies clear causal conclusions. 
Because laboratory approaches excel in just this respect, at the very least good experimental 
designs are likely to provide a complementary and confirmatory check on empirical methods.”). 
Professor Russell Korobkin has noted the limits of empirical evidence in illuminating legally-
relevant questions: “Potentially even more troubling, however, is that the data required for such 
studies is often impossible (or virtually impossible) to obtain and, even when it can be obtained, 
the results themselves or the implications to be drawn from the results will often be contestable 
and ultimately indeterminate.” Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and 
Economics, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 786 (2005). 
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behavior outside the plea-bargaining context. Finally, Part II.C 
reports the results of multiple experimental tests of plea bargaining 
that bring the psychological underpinnings of the innocence effect 
into sharper relief and provide a firmer foundation for the positive 
and normative analyses we undertake in Part III. 
A. Alternative Accounts 
Two alternative accounts would attribute the innocence effect to 
the nature of the cases facing innocent defendants rather than to 
innocence itself. According to the first account, innocents refuse the 
bargain more often because, on average, they face weaker 
prosecution cases and thus a better chance of acquittal at trial. 
Because both parties know that the case is weak, the defendant is 
unwilling to plead guilty. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this argument fails to 
consider the impact of prosecutorial discretion and incentives on plea 
bargaining. As long as prosecutors know the strength of their cases 
and are willing and able to adjust their plea offers based on the 
probability of conviction at trial using charge, fact, or sentence 
bargaining,81 the rate at which defendants accept plea offers should 
remain the same in weaker and stronger cases.82 In fact, we already 
noted that prosecutors are expected to make more—rather than 
less—attractive plea offers in weaker cases that they still decide to 
prosecute in an effort to avoid the risk of failure to convict at trial.83 
In strong cases, prosecutors worry less about the possibility of trial 
because they are confident that they will secure a conviction. By 
contrast, in weak cases they will do much more to secure a guilty plea 
because an acquittal at trial is more likely. In fact, the behavior of the 
Tulia defendants, who knew that the cases against them were strong,84 
and the results of the experimental studies that controlled for the 
 
 81. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 82. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 58–60 (describing the administrative and tactical 
pressures that lead prosecutors to scale offers to the strength of their case); Champion, supra 
note 8, at 257 (showing that prosecutors have “an overwhelming propensity” to moderate the 
terms of the deal in weak cases). 
 83. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 106–07 
(noting that prosecutors are often measured by their rate of convictions and thus care much 
more about conviction than sentencing); Bibas, supra note 3, at 2472 (“Losses at trial hurt 
prosecutors’ public images, so prosecutors have incentives to take to trial only extremely strong 
cases and to bargain away weak ones.”); Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2318 (explaining why 
prosecutors do their utmost to cut deals in weak cases, as the risk of acquittal is relatively high). 
 84. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
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probability of conviction85 further demonstrate that the innocence 
effect cannot be attributed to the possible weakness of the cases 
against innocent defendants. 
Under the second account, one might argue that the low rate of 
plea bargains is a result of innocent defendants’ rational evaluation of 
their trial prospects. After all, trials are designed to reveal the truth. 
Under this view, innocent defendants will rationally estimate that 
their chances are better than those of guilty defendants. However, 
prosecutors, who bring charges only against suspects that they believe 
to be guilty, do not know which defendants in fact are innocent. 
Therefore, they cannot take innocence into account when adjusting 
the plea offer to the evidence of defendants’ culpability that they 
otherwise possess. This information asymmetry hinders the 
negotiation between prosecutors and innocents and diminishes the 
likelihood of successful plea bargaining with these defendants.86 
Notwithstanding the likely contribution of information 
asymmetry to the innocence effect, however, its significance should 
not be overstated. Trials, like plea bargaining, are shaped by the 
available evidence. As Professor Stephen Schulhofer explained, 
“[i]nnocence by itself (that is, apart from its link to particular 
evidence) can have only a small impact on the odds of conviction.”87 
On the other hand, innocents who possess evidence that will assist 
them at trial typically can use it during plea bargaining as well.88 
Therefore, besides those uncommon cases in which innocent 
defendants might prefer to conceal admissible, acquitting evidence to 
surprise the prosecution at trial, rational innocents would much rather 
use that evidence earlier to convince the prosecutor to dismiss the 
case or at least to offer a more attractive plea bargain. 
We are hard pressed to believe, for instance, that nearly all of the 
defendants in the exoneration database refused to plead guilty simply 
because they correctly estimated that their chances of acquittal at trial 
were high—due to private information that they could not 
convincingly convey to prosecutors—yet ultimately were all 
wrongfully convicted. We do know, moreover, that the Tulia 
 
 85. See infra notes 156–172 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 753–55 (explaining that the utility of plea 
bargaining will be limited when prosecutors cannot distinguish guilty from innocent 
defendants); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1940–46 (describing in detail the effects of 
imperfect information on plea-bargaining strategy). 
 87. Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1984. 
 88. Id. at 1984 & n.21. 
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defendants did not possess any private information when they refused 
to plea.89 Similarly, those innocent experimental participants in 
Gregory et al.’s studies,90 as well as the participants who refused to 
plea bargain in the additional experimental tests reported in Part II.C, 
had no private information. 
Furthermore, prosecutors are well aware that their plea offers 
must include a substantial discount to attract defendants with a broad 
range of risk attitudes and estimates of trial prospects.91 In fact, 
prosecutors’ offers must be attractive not only to the average 
defendant but to nearly all defendants. Consequently, a small 
difference in the parties’ trial predictions—whether based on private 
information or any other factor—is unlikely to prevent prosecutors 
and defendants from reaching an agreement.92 
B. Psychological Insights 
We found that innocent defendants are less willing to plea 
bargain than guilty defendants are, even under similar charges and 
evidence, and that the nature of the cases that innocents face provides 
an insufficient account for their plea reluctance. To gain a better 
understanding of the mechanisms that generate innocents’ plea 
rejections, we turn to the rich psychological literature that studies 
similar behaviors outside the plea-bargaining context. Specifically, we 
focus on two important elements that defendants take into account 
according to the shadow-of-trial model when deciding whether to 
plea bargain: their beliefs regarding the expected sanction at trial and 
their risk preferences. 
1.  Beliefs and Preferences in the Shadow of Trial.  Defendants’ 
beliefs play a central role in shadow-of-trial models: defendants must 
compare the certain sanction offered by the plea to the probabilistic 
 
 89. See supra Part I.C.  
 90. See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.  
 91. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 714–15 (“[P]rosecutors are not content merely to vector 
the risks of litigation. . . . [T]hey tailor their offers not to balance but to overbalance a 
defendant’s chances of acquittal.”).  
 92. One might argue that prosecutors can offer minimal discounts to all defendants and 
then offer better deals to those who reject their initial offers. This practice would allow 
prosecutors to distinguish among defendants who hold different risk attitudes and different 
estimates of trial outcomes. Because defense attorneys are repeat players, however, prosecutors 
could not employ such a strategy without losing their ability to threaten defendants with a 
credible final offer. To establish credibility, prosecutors must offer similar deals to similarly 
situated defendants and then try those defendants who reject the offers. 
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sanction at trial, which will be meted out only if they are convicted. In 
the simplest case, prosecutors and defendants possess the same 
evidence and make identical, objective, and rational predictions of 
likely trial outcomes based on this common information. More 
complex models may account for cases in which defendants’ private 
information leads them to form different beliefs about the likely 
outcomes of trial from those held by prosecutors.93 
Shadow-of-trial models—like traditional law-and-economics 
models more generally—assume that the parties are strictly rational.94 
At most, given the incomplete information available at the plea-
bargaining stage, prosecutors and defendants will make occasional 
mistakes, thereby overestimating or underestimating the expected 
sanction at trial. When both parties share such mistakes, the 
likelihood of plea bargaining is unaffected.95 And even when the 
occasional erroneous judgment creates a gap between the parties’ 
beliefs—such as when a defendant underestimates or a prosecutor 
overestimates the expected sanction at trial—they are still likely to 
reach agreement because prosecutors’ generous offers already take 
into account the possibility of judgment errors by either party.96 
Because shadow-of-trial models envision the defendant as 
rationally balancing certain versus probable sanctions, defendants’ 
risk preferences are a decisive consideration in any such model.97 That 
is, different defendants exhibit different propensities to accept 
identical plea offers when faced with the same expected sanctions at 
 
 93. See Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 753–55 (describing a model in which defendants’ 
decisions are impacted by their knowledge of their guilt or innocence). 
 94. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (8th ed. 2011) (“The task 
of economics . . . is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of 
his ends in life . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 1–2 (2004) (discussing the role of the rationality assumption in descriptive 
analysis and noting that “the view taken will generally be that actors are ‘rational,’” “forward-
looking and behav[ing] so as to maximize their expected utility”); see also Russell B. Korobkin 
& Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from 
Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1060–66 (2000) (reviewing various formulations of 
rational action within legal scholarship).  
 95. Cf. Landes, supra note 5, at 67 (“If both parties agree on the probability of conviction 
by trial, a settlement will take place for defendants who are risk averse or risk neutral . . . .”). 
 96. See id. at 68 & n.14 (showing that even defendants who are optimistic about their 
chances of acquittal at trial might still accept a plea offer); see also supra note 91 and 
accompanying text.  
 97. Professor Landes already incorporated defendants’ risk aversion into his seminal 
model. Landes, supra note 5, at 61–63. Professors Gene Grossman and Michael Katz discussed 
the influence of society’s attitude to risk as well. Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 750–52. 
GAZAY-AYAL & TOR IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012  2:02 PM 
2012] THE INNOCENCE EFFECT 367 
trial. Risk-neutral defendants simply maximize the expected value of 
their choices, accepting all bargains that offer a sanction lower than 
the expected sanction at trial and rejecting all other offers.98 More 
advanced models, however, account for criminal defendants who are 
risk-averse—as individuals are thought to be with respect to 
significant decisions more generally.99 Risk-averse defendants, by 
definition, find the negative outcome of conviction at trial to be of 
greater concern than the probability of conviction alone would 
indicate. Not only will such defendants accept plea offers that equal 
the expected sanction at trial, they will accept offers that are higher 
than the expected sanction, all to avoid the risk of an even higher 
sanction in case of their conviction at trial. 
In a similar vein, risk-seeking defendants reject even offers that 
equal the expected sanction at trial. Such defendants are less 
concerned about conviction and sanction at trial and therefore 
demand that the plea offer discount the sanction beyond its expected 
value before accepting it. Notably, traditional shadow-of-trial models 
 
 98. Note that, in reality, risk-neutral, and even risk-averse, defendants may reject offers 
that equal the expected value at trial because of a diminishing marginal sensitivity to 
incarceration. Although incarceration is always undesirable, a doubly long period of 
incarceration, for instance, may be less than doubly undesirable. In this case, risk-averse 
defendants with a 50 percent chance of a four-year incarceration may still reject a plea bargain 
that is set at the expected value of a two-year incarceration. See William Spelman, The Severity 
of Intermediate Sanctions, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 107, 113 (1995) (summarizing empirical 
studies that found that defendants who were interviewed shortly after being arrested regarded a 
five-year prison sentence to be only twice as severe as a one-year sentence, and a ten-year 
sentence to be about four to five times more severe than a one-year sentence). Moreover, the 
findings of research on intertemporal choice—such as that facing defendants in the shadow of 
trial—reveal that people tend to be hyperbolic discounters, giving disproportional weight to 
short-term outcomes over long-term ones. See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic 
Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME, 57 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) 
(explaining the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting). But risk-averse defendants who are 
hyperbolic discounters will have further cause to reject offers that are set at the expected value 
of trial because future incarceration matters to them far less than near-term incarceration 
following the plea. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538–41 (1998) (arguing that “years 
in prison far in the future will be discounted very heavily” against more short-term 
consequences); see also Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2338 (arguing that “future [prison time] is 
heavily discounted by defendants”). Yet insofar as diminishing marginal sensitivity and 
hyperbolic discounting exert similar pressure on guilty and innocent defendants, these processes 
do not alter the present analysis, which focuses on the differences between the two types of 
defendants.  
 99. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44–46 (6th ed. 
2012) (noting that, in decisions involving monetary outcomes, economists assume that decision 
makers are risk-averse or, at times, risk-neutral); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 52–53 (2d ed. 1989) (same).  
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pay little attention to the case of risk-seeking defendants,100 as this risk 
attitude usually is considered irrational.101 Moreover, even 
behaviorally informed research suggesting that criminal defendants 
may be more risk seeking than other individuals does not consider the 
possibility of a systematic divergence in risk attitudes between 
innocent and guilty defendants.102 
In sum, although defendants’ beliefs and preferences are central 
to shadow-of-trial models, these models account for neither the 
possibility of the occasional erroneous belief nor the prospect of risk-
seeking defendants exerting an appreciable effect on overall plea-
bargaining rates. Even more importantly, however, the extant 
literature’s failure to identify the innocence effect means that shadow-
of-trial models do not consider the fact that innocent and guilty 
defendants exhibit systematically different beliefs and preferences in 
comparable settings.103 
Yet the extensive psychological literature on human judgment 
and decision making reveals a number of processes that might 
underlie the innocence effect identified by our empirical evidence. 
These processes can lead innocents to hold, first, systematically more 
optimistic beliefs than guilty defendants, which make trial prospects 
seem more attractive to the former than they appear to the latter; 
and, second, more risk-seeking preferences that diminish for 
innocents the attractiveness of the standard plea offers made by 
prosecutors to all similarly situated defendants. 
 
 100. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 5, at 67–68; Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 755–56 
(discussing the effects of varying degrees of risk aversion without addressing risk seeking).  
 101. Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 99, at 45 (“[M]ost people are averse toward risk, but 
some people . . . like gamblers, rock climbers, and race car drivers, prefer risk.”); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 122 (1996) 
(“Although the economic models of suit and settlement allow for the possibility that parties 
make risk-seeking choices, this possibility is not taken seriously.”). 
 102. See Birke, supra note 16, at 208–10 (discussing “four hypotheses that attempt to 
reconcile the rate of guilty pleas and the principle of loss aversion” and making no distinction 
between innocent and guilty defendants). One exception is Professor Bibas, who reaches a 
conclusion opposite to our empirical findings by speculating that innocent defendants might be 
less susceptible to loss aversion because “[m]ost criminals are less risk averse (at least with 
regard to imprisonment) than law-abiding citizens.” Bibas, supra note 3, at 2509–10. 
 103. Intriguingly, one of the foundational papers in the shadow-of-trial literature on plea 
bargaining briefly mentions this possibility without examining it further. See Landes, supra note 
5, at 69 (“[A]n innocent person may have an aversion to lying so that he would have a greater 
reluctance to plead guilty to an offense than a guilty person. This can be interpreted as imposing 
psychic losses on a guilty plea for an innocent suspect which would . . . increase the likelihood of 
a trial.”).  
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2.  Diverging Beliefs.  The empirical psychological literature 
reveals a number of phenomena that are likely to impact innocent 
and guilty defendants differently. In this Section, we briefly explore 
the potential contribution of the illusion of transparency, the belief in 
a just world, and the availability heuristic.104 
The illusion of transparency refers to people’s common tendency 
to overestimate the degree to which others can discern their internal 
states—whether thoughts, feelings, or sensations.105 In a series of 
studies, for example, researchers showed that experimental 
participants who are induced to lie overestimate the detectability of 
their lies.106 Participants in one study played a multiple-round, round-
robin game in which they told either lies (in one round) or the truth 
(in all other rounds) and observed the statements of other 
participants.107 As predicted, participants overestimated the degree to 
which others could detect whether they were telling the truth.108 
Later studies showed that the illusion of transparency appears in 
negotiation settings as well. Even experienced negotiators 
overestimated the degree to which their negotiation partners were 
able to discern information that they tried to convey about their 
preferences.109 Importantly for our purposes, one study showed that 
this psychological phenomenon varies with the degree of power that 
 
 104. Another important judgment process that may affect innocent and guilty defendants 
differently is the biasing effect that preferences exert on beliefs, which we discuss infra notes 
123–152 and accompanying text. Notably, most of the processes that lead individuals to 
overoptimistic predictions of their future prospects are expected to impact criminal defendants 
generally without systematically distinguishing the innocent from the guilty. See Tor, supra note 
17, at 245–72 (providing a brief review of these processes).  
 105. Thomas Gilovich, Victoria Husted Medvec & Kenneth Savitsky, The Illusion of 
Transparency: Biased Assessments of Others’ Ability To Read Our Emotional States, 75 J. 
PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 332, 332–33 (1998) (noting that the illusion of transparency is one 
manifestation of egocentrically biased perspective taking, in which individuals estimate the 
perspective of others using their own phenomenological experience as a starting point and 
insufficiently adjust from it); see also John R. Chambers, Nicholas Epley, Kenneth Savitsky & 
Paul D. Windschitl, Knowing Too Much: Using Private Knowledge To Predict How One Is 
Viewed by Others, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 542, 542 (2008) (showing that the difficulty people have in 
intuiting how they are viewed by others is caused by their active reliance on private information 
that others do not have access to). 
 106. Gilovich, supra note 105, at 332. 
 107. Id. at 334–35. 
 108. Id. Follow-up studies further showed that participants’ overestimation of others’ ability 
to detect their lies stemmed from the illusion of transparency rather than from competing 
psychological accounts, such as a belief in the general detectability of lies. Id. at 335–36. 
 109. Leaf Van Boven, Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Illusion of 
Transparency in Negotiations, 2003 NEG. J. 117, 124 (2003). 
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negotiators possess. Less powerful negotiators—who in this study 
were given the role of an employee—exhibited a stronger illusion of 
transparency than did more powerful negotiators—who were 
assigned the role of a manager.110 These findings suggest that the 
pervasive illusion may be stronger among defendants, who are in an 
exceptionally weak position in the face of criminal charges. 
In fact, two separate studies that examined the behavior of mock 
criminal suspects at the investigation stage found the illusion of 
transparency to be at work. In the first study, innocent participants 
were significantly more likely than their guilty counterparts to waive 
their Miranda rights.111 The difference between the innocent and the 
guilty was caused by the naive belief that is held by most innocent 
defendants in the power of their innocence to set them free.112 In the 
second study, which examined suspects’ strategies during police 
interrogations, guilty suspects employed a variety of strategies to 
appear truthful, but innocents sought to tell the truth as it happened, 
reflecting a belief in the visibility of their innocence.113 
Defendants operating under the illusion of transparency will 
overestimate a court’s ability to determine whether they are telling 
the truth. These defendants will adjust their trial predictions to their 
subjective knowledge regarding their culpability well beyond what the 
objective evidence against them would dictate. In such cases, we 
should find a systematic divergence between the trial predictions of 
innocents, who will overestimate their probability of acquittal, and of 
guilty defendants, who will underestimate it. 
The common belief in a just world—people’s tendency to view 
the world as a just place where individuals get what they deserve114—is 
another factor that may contribute to the systematic discrepancy 
 
 110. Stephen M. Garcia, Power and the Illusion of Transparency in Negotiation, 17 J. BUS. & 
PSYCHOL. 133, 142–43 (2002). 
 111. Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The 
Power of Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 217 (2004). 
 112. Id. at 218. 
 113. Maria Hartwig, Pär Anders Granhag & Leif A. Strömwall, Guilty and Innocent 
Suspects’ Strategies During Police Interrogations, 13 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 213, 224–25 (2007). 
 114. An early formulation of the theory can be found in Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, 
Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1030 (1978). For more recent reviews of this phenomenon, its scope, and its limitations, see 
generally Adrian Furnham, Belief in a Just World: Research Progress over the Past Decade, 34 
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 795 (2003); Carolyn L. Hafer & Laurent Bègue, 
Experimental Research on Just-World Theory: Problems, Developments, and Future Challenges, 
131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 128 (2005).  
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between innocent and guilty defendants’ beliefs. According to 
research on this phenomenon, people’s need to believe in a just world 
is manifested in their responses to observed justice and injustice.115 
Because of the belief in a just world, for instance, the guilty 
excessively may fear the discovery of further evidence that would 
ensure their conviction, whereas the innocent may unduly believe that 
their lawyers will gather evidence or witnesses that will prove their 
innocence. When present, such beliefs could lead guilty defendants to 
underestimate their trial prospects, but these beliefs could also 
encourage the innocent mistakenly to overestimate them.116 
The differential effects of the illusion of transparency and the 
belief in a just world on innocent and guilty defendants are likely to 
be reinforced by the pervasive availability heuristic.117 This heuristic is 
often used in assessments of the probability of events. Judgments that 
rely on the availability heuristic exploit people’s better and faster 
recall of more—as opposed to less—common instances or events and 
on their finding it easier to imagine likely occurrences than unlikely 
ones.118 When judging by availability, people substitute the ease of 
mental retrieval or construction for a direct estimation of the actual 
numerosity of a class or the likelihood of an event.119 
Availability-based judgments are useful because they are rapid, 
effortless, and typically quite accurate. But they also generate 
predictable errors. Some variables impact availability but not 
 
 115. E.g., Hafer & Bègue, supra note 114, at 128. 
 116. Cf. Gregory et al., supra note 13, at 1526 (suggesting that the belief in a just world may 
lead innocents erroneously to think that their refusal to plea bargain will serve as evidence of 
their innocence). One might speculate, however, that just-world beliefs exert a greater effect on 
guilty defendants than on those innocents who have already suffered through the various stages 
of the criminal-justice process up to this point. 
 117. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (explaining the availability 
heuristic). For a brief summary and some legal applications, see Tor, supra note 17, at 248–49.  
 118. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 117, at 208. 
 119. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11–14 (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 9th prtg. 1988); see also Norbert Schwarz & Leigh 
Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as 
Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 103, 117–18 (Thomas Gilovich, Dave Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) 
(disentangling two potential mechanisms underlying the availability heuristic and concluding 
that the ease of recall is the mechanism of more general relevance); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra, at 163, 163–78 (exploring different 
types of judgments by availability). 
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probability and frequency; others affect probability and frequency but 
not availability.120 For example, factors that make instances easier to 
retrieve or imagine without changing their true probability lead to a 
systematic overestimation in availability-driven judgments.121 To 
illustrate, although people generally hold reasonable estimates of the 
relative lethality of various potential causes of death, they 
systematically misestimate the frequency of causes of death that tend 
to be under- or over-publicized, so that the risk of homicide is 
dramatically overestimated, but the risk of death by stroke is 
underestimated.122 
Due to availability effects in recall and construction, guilty 
defendants—who better recall incriminating evidence—will tend to 
overestimate their trial risk and find it easier to imagine how this 
evidence could lead to their conviction in court. Innocents, on the 
other hand, will tend to exhibit the opposite tendencies, 
underestimating their likelihood of conviction at trial. 
3.  Diverging Preferences.  An extensive empirical literature 
documents how considerations of fairness impact individuals’ 
preferences and decisions.123 The wrongful conviction of the innocent 
is commonly perceived as an unjust or unfair outcome,124 whereas 
convicting the guilty is not only just or fair but a main function of the 
criminal-justice system. It is plausible, therefore, that innocents view 
their wrongful conviction following a plea bargain as unjust or unfair. 
Guilty defendants, on the other hand, may not share that view of the 
bargain even if they find the prospect of conviction to be 
undesirable.125 Therefore, fairness considerations can lead innocents, 
 
 120. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 117, at 209. 
 121. Id.; see also John S. Carroll, The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations for the 
Event: An Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic, 14 J. EXPERIM. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
88, 94 (1978) (finding that participants who imagined events made higher-probability estimates 
of these events than did other participants who did not imagine them). 
 122. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: 
Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 
supra note 119, at 463, 465–72. 
 123. Importantly, the processes that we describe here, which generate the diverging risk 
attitudes of the innocent and the guilty, exert their effect in addition to those universal risk-
seeking tendencies that are explored in other behaviorally informed scholarship. See supra note 
16 and accompanying text. 
 124. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72 (1985) (“People have a profound 
right not to be convicted of crimes of which they are innocent.”). 
 125. Of course, guilty defendants may still find the sanction offered in the plea bargain to be 
excessive in light of the offense, the expected sanction at trial, or in comparison to other plea 
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in a number of distinct ways, to exhibit greater risk-seeking in their 
plea behavior than guilty defendants. 
First, studies demonstrate that people care about receiving fair 
treatment in bargaining, engage in costly retaliation against unfair 
treatment, and react negatively to such treatment even when 
retaliation is impossible.126 One illustrative and extensively studied 
case of such fairness-oriented behavior is the ultimatum game, in 
which one player (Proposer) is asked to allocate a given sum of 
money to himself and another player (Responder), and the latter 
must choose whether to accept the offered allocation.127 If Responder 
accepts, each party gets a share according to the offer; if Responder 
rejects the offer, both parties get nothing.128 The basic game is 
anonymous and without repetition, thus strategic considerations, such 
as developing a certain reputation, logically are irrelevant.129 
A rational Responder should accept any positive sum of money 
because the alternative to acceptance is rejection without any 
payment. In reality, however, Responders tend to reject offers that 
are below 20 to 30 percent of the sum that stands for allocation, and 
Proposers usually offer an even greater proportion of 40 to 50 percent 
of the sum.130 These findings hold true when the game is conducted 
with significant sums of money.131 Responders’ behavior reveals 
 
offers in similar cases. See Tor et al., supra note 68, at 107–09 (providing empirical evidence that 
comparative evaluations of a plea bargain affect a defendant’s willingness to accept a plea 
offer). 
 126. See, e.g., Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin Camerer, 
Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995) (offering 
experimental evidence for fairness-driven biases in negotiation by parties to a hypothetical tort 
case); George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, Self-Serving 
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993) (same); Matthew 
Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 
1283–84 (1993) (explaining the importance of fairness considerations for understanding 
behavior). 
 127. See Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of 
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 370 (1982) (providing an early report of 
the ultimatum game); Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253, 258 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) 
(summarizing findings of ultimatum-game experiments). The ultimatum-game literature is very 
large. One readable, high-quality summary is available in COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL 
GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 48–55 (2003).  
 128. CAMERER, supra note 127, at 8. 
 129. Id. at 62–63 (noting the lengths to which researchers went to ensure subject anonymity 
in the experiment). 
 130. Id. at 49–52.  
 131. Id. at 60–62. 
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people’s willingness to forgo substantial financial gain to punish even 
an anonymous Proposer whom they will never encounter again in 
response to an unfair offer. Further research shows, moreover, that 
Responders’ negative emotional reactions play a significant role in 
their costly decisions to reject unfair offers.132 Therefore, innocent 
defendants may be more likely than their guilty counterparts to react 
in the manner exhibited in the ultimatum game and to reject what 
they view as unfair plea offers. 
A second way in which fairness-driven behavior may separate 
the innocent from the guilty follows from the somewhat subtle 
interaction among fairness perceptions and loss aversion. Unlike the 
hypothetical rational actor of standard shadow-of-trial models, real 
individuals tend to view alternative options—such as plea bargaining 
versus trial—as positive or negative depending on whether the 
alternative options appear to be better or worse than a 
psychologically neutral reference point.133 Choice, in other words, is 
reference dependent.134 Decision makers tend to be loss-averse: they 
are not equally sensitive to positive and negative outcomes of similar 
magnitudes, instead finding negative outcomes much more painful 
than they find positive ones attractive.135 
The combination of reference dependence and loss aversion 
leads people to react differently to the options available to them 
depending on whether they view these options as gains or losses—a 
 
 132. Madan M. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan, Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional 
Rejections of Ultimatum Offers, 68 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DEC. PROC. 208, 208, 220 (1996); see 
also Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, On the Nature of Fair Behavior, 41 ECON. 
INQUIRY 20, 25 (2003) (“[R]esponders take into account not only the distributive consequences 
of the proposer’s action but also the intention signaled by the action.”). 
 133. Cf. Rachlinski, supra note 101, at 119 (“Responses to a number of closely controlled 
hypothetical scenarios demonstrate that the appeal of a settlement depends on whether the 
settlement is characterized as a loss or as a gain.”). 
 134. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277–80 (1979). Note also that prospect theory is only the most 
famous member of a large family of models that seek a better descriptive fit by modifying some 
rational-choice assumptions. See generally Chris Stramer, Developments in Nonexpected-Utility 
Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice Under Risk, in ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 104 (Colin F. Camerer, George Lowenstein, & Matthew Rabin eds., 
2004) (reviewing the development of such theories, how they fare in experimental tests, and 
how they can be used). 
 135. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 134, at 280 (“With a single exception, utility 
functions were considerably steeper for losses than for gains.”). 
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phenomenon known as the “framing effect.”136 When facing the 
prospect of gains, individuals usually are risk-averse, choosing, for 
instance, a sure gain of $100 over the 50/50 prospect of receiving 
either $200 or nothing. In both cases, the expected value of either 
option is $100, but individuals overwhelmingly choose the certain 
outcome over the option that includes the prospect of gaining 
nothing. Yet typically the opposite attitude of risk seeking is 
displayed when decision makers believe that they are facing the 
prospect of a loss, so that they prefer, for example, an 80 percent 
probability of losing $100 to a sure loss of $80, notwithstanding their 
identical $80 expected values. 
Notably, the effects of framing in legal settings have been 
investigated in a number of civil litigation and settlement studies.137 
As in criminal cases, each party in civil litigation has to determine 
whether it prefers the sure compromise outcome of a settlement to 
the risky trial with its potential for either a better or a worse 
outcome.138 Prospect theory suggests that civil defendants’ risk 
attitudes will depend on whether they view the trial-versus-settlement 
decision as a choice between losses or between gains.139 For instance, 
defendants who profited from a breach of contract and are being sued 
for damages may compare both trial and settlement to the status quo, 
view them as losses, and thus exhibit risk seeking.140 The same 
 
 136. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 251 (1986) (reviewing and explaining some of the evidence of the framing 
effect).  
 137. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 101, at 136–40 (providing a detailed account, including 
experimental and observational evidence, of the potential role of framing in litigation and 
settlement); see also Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 163, 185–87 (2000) (using some features of an advanced version of prospect theory 
to explain frivolous litigation behavior); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, 
Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 121 
(1997) (using framing to explain evaluations of settlement options by lawyers and clients). 
 138. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1984) (proposing an economic model that predicts when settlement 
occurs in the shadow of trial); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis 
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56–58 
(1982) (proposing an economic model of litigation that accounts for allocation of costs).  
 139. See Rachlinski, supra note 101, at 121 (“[P]rospect theory predicts that people make 
either risk-averse or risk-seeking choices depending upon the characterization of the decision as 
a loss or as a gain.”). See generally id. (finding support for the effect of framing on settlement 
decisions in both simulation studies and actual cases). For simplicity, our discussion sets aside 
the significant issue of attorney fees, which also differ across legal systems. 
 140. See id. at 118–19 (“[D]efendants choose between accepting a sure loss by settling, and 
accepting an uncertain but potentially worse outcome by litigating further. . . . [W]hen people 
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defendants, however, would be risk-averse if they were to evaluate 
these prospects in reference to their position before profiting from 
the breach of contract, which makes both trial and settlement appear 
as gains.141 
Framing may shape litigants’ risk attitudes not only by 
determining whether trial and settlement appear as monetary losses 
or gains, but also through defendants’ perceptions of fairness. When 
judging fairness, the neutral reference point is what people perceive 
as minimally fair; better outcomes are viewed as fair gains and worse 
outcomes as unfair losses.142 Hence, people will tend to exhibit risk 
aversion when choosing among fair outcomes but risk seeking when 
facing unfair ones.143 
We have already seen that considerations of justice and fairness 
loom large in criminal defendants’ plea bargaining decisions. 
Innocents will tend to view the conviction and sanction required by 
the plea as unfair and negative, views that encourage risk seeking. At 
the same time, guilty defendants—insofar as they view conviction as a 
fair, if undesirable, outcome and the discounted plea offer as a 
positive outcome—will exhibit risk aversion. The interaction among 
loss aversion, framing effects, and considerations of fairness may thus 
reinforce the diverging plea attitudes of the innocent and the guilty, 
with the former, more risk-seeking defendants rejecting plea offers 
that the latter, risk-averse ones, find attractive. 
Third and finally, defendants’ considerations of fairness may also 
contribute to the diverging beliefs of the innocent and the guilty 
regarding their trial prospects discussed in the preceding section. The 
psychological literature reveals a number of ways in which 
individuals’ preferences bias their judgments.144 The effects of 
 
choose among losses, they tend to make risk-seeking choices, preferring riskier outcomes over 
sure losses.”). 
 141. See id. at 129 n.65 (“To be sure, one might argue that both parties in the hypothetical 
[copyright-infringement suit] choose among gains, since they are essentially dividing the profits 
made from the marketing materials protected by copyright.”). 
 142. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a 
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986) 
(discussing framing effects in fairness judgments). 
 143. See Tor et al., supra note 68, at 104–07 (noting this phenomenon in the context of guilty 
and innocent defendants). 
 144. See, e.g., Elisha Babad, Wishful Thinking and Objectivity Among Sports Fans, 2 SOC. 
BEHAV. 231, at 237–38 (1987) (reporting participants’ biased predictions and estimates in the 
direction of their preferences); Elisha Babad & Yosi Katz, Wishful Thinking—Against All Odds, 
21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1921, at 1931, 1934–35 (1991) (same); David V. Budescu & Meira 
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phenomena such as wishful thinking or the desirability bias are strong 
in situations in which people have a measure of control over 
outcomes, as in the case of newlyweds’ predictions regarding the 
future prospects of their marriage.145 But the evidence also reveals 
that preferences bias expectations in settings that more closely 
resemble the predicament of the criminal defendant at trial, in which 
decision makers have limited or even no control over outcomes. For 
example, people tend to overestimate the likelihood and degree of 
success of the candidate or party that they favor in an election, the 
team that they like better in a sports’ match, or the company in which 
they have invested, despite the fact that their actions cannot exert any 
effect on these outcomes.146 In a similar vein, innocent defendants’ 
strong negative reactions to the injustice of a plea bargain are likely 
to bias their trial predictions more strongly than in the case of their 
guilty counterparts. 
The biasing effect of fairness preferences on defendants’ beliefs 
may also operate  through the affect heuristic, which allows people to 
substitute affective “tags”—such as “good” or “bad”—that they 
associate with the targets of judgment for a direct evaluation of these 
targets.147 This heuristic simplifies judgmental processes by consulting 
 
Bruderman, The Relationship Between the Illusion of Control and the Desirability Bias, 8 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 109, at 132 (1995) (same); Donald Granberg & Edward Brent, 
When Prophecy Bends: The Preference-Expectation Link in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-
1980, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 477, 477–79 & tbl.1 (1983) (same); Robert A. Olsen, 
Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some Evidence from Experts, 10 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 66–70 (1997) (same); Roy M. Poses & Michele Anthony, 
Availability, Wishful Thinking, and Physicians’ Diagnostic Judgments for Patients with Suspected 
Bacteremia, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 159, 165–66 (1991) (same); George Wright & Peter 
Ayton, Subjective Confidence in Forecasts: A Response to Fischhoff and McGregor, 5 J. 
FORECASTING 117, 120–21 (1986) (same). 
 145. See Peter Harris, Sufficient Grounds for Optimism?: The Relationship Between 
Perceived Controllability and Optimistic Bias, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 9, 24–25 (1996) 
(finding strong evidence of wishful thinking and the desirability bias in predictions of positive 
events and finding weaker evidence of their existence in predictions of negative events); Neil D. 
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 806, 808 (1980) (“[T]he greater the perceived controllability of a positive event, the 
greater the tendency for people to believe that their own chances are greater than average.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 146. See, e.g., Babad, supra note 144, at 237–38 (noting this phenomenon in the context of 
sports); Babad & Katz, supra note 144, at 1931, 1934–35 (same); Granberg & Brent, supra note 
144, at 477–79 & tbl.1 (noting this phenomenon in the political context).  
 147. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES, supra note 119, at 49, 56–57 (noting that people subconsciously substitute affective 
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readily available affective impressions. When it is employed, 
evaluations depend on whether the assessed outcomes are tagged as 
affectively positive or negative.148 For instance, studies suggest that 
variations in the probability of different outcomes matter relatively 
little when judgments are based on affective reactions.149 Moreover, 
other research reveals that people rely on the affect heuristic when 
assessing the risks and benefits of different activities.150 This reliance 
on affect leads people erroneously to believe that activities they deem 
to be beneficial, such as vaccinations, are also low-risk, while at the 
same time considering activities that they dislike to be more risky 
than they objectively are.151 Thus, we speculate that innocent 
defendants, who have a negative reaction to the plea offer, might 
consider trial to be more attractive than it really is, either because the 
affect heuristic leads them to overestimate the benefits of trial with its 
potential for acquittal or because they insufficiently account for trial 
risk altogether.152 
C. Experimental Evidence 
The preceding sections document the extensive psychological 
literature outside the plea-bargaining context that suggests that the 
innocence effect may be caused by innocents’ more optimistic beliefs 
 
judgments for stimuli, thereby responding to the general assessment of good or bad instead of to 
the stimulus itself).  
 148. See Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect 
Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 14 (2000) (“In 
this way, judgments of risk and benefit are guided and linked by affect.”). See generally Paul 
Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 119, at 397 (discussing 
the reliance that humans place on affect when they make decisions). 
 149. See, e.g., Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric 
Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (2001) (finding that 
probability matters less in situations in which outcomes are affect rich); see also George F. 
Loewenstein, Christopher K. Hsee, Elke U. Weber & Ned Welch, Risk as Feelings, 127 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 276 (2001) (“Subsequent increments in probability (past zero) . . . have 
little additional emotional impact and, presumably for this reason, have little impact on 
choice.”).  
 150. See generally Slovic et al., supra note 148 (analyzing applications of the affect heuristic 
in various situations).  
 151. See generally Finucane et al., supra note 148 (discussing the inverse relationship 
between one’s perception of risk and one’s perception of benefit).  
 152. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
933, 942–43 (2006) (citing evidence of the role of the affect heuristic in the courtroom, in which 
the likelihood of a decision that favors a given party may increase or decrease depending on the 
affective reaction that the party generates in court).  
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regarding their trial prospects or by their greater risk seeking 
compared to the guilty, or by some combination of these two sets of 
causes. For the purpose of developing plea-bargaining policy, 
however, it is preferable to have more direct evidence of the 
processes that underlie the innocence effect, a task to which real-
world evidence is not well suited. 
For instance, the field data provide indications that the Tulia 
defendants’ refusals to bargain was at least partly driven by 
considerations of justice and fairness.153 It is also possible—though not 
at all certain—that at least the first eight defendants who refused to 
engage in plea bargaining also were more optimistic regarding their 
trial odds than guilty defendants in their positions would have been. 
Insofar as the thirty innocents who faced trial after the first eight 
defendants were convicted held fairness preferences similar to those 
of their earlier counterparts, one might be tempted to attribute their 
much higher plea-acceptance rate to a more realistic appraisal of their 
odds, having seen the conviction and long prison sentences meted out 
at trial to the defendants who preceded them.154 If this were the case, 
however, defendants’ optimistic judgments would appear to be the 
dominant driver of the innocence effect, fairness concerns 
notwithstanding. Yet those later defendants also received 
dramatically discounted offers, which could have made plea 
bargaining attractive even for defendants holding biased beliefs 
regarding their trial prospects.155 
Thus, even the highly informative Tulia dataset does not clarify 
whether innocents truly are more optimistic than similarly situated 
guilty defendants. Nor do these cases reveal whether fairness 
preferences alone—in the absence of biased beliefs—suffice to 
generate an innocence effect, particularly when conviction is not 
virtually certain. Similarly, the plea bargaining studies discussed in 
Part I.D provide some insight into the causes of the innocence effect 
but still leave important questions unresolved. 
To attempt to answer some of these questions, the authors and a 
colleague conducted a series of experimental tests of fairness in plea 
 
 153. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.  
 154. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 47, at 160 (“After . . . yet another maximum sentence, 
defendants started pleading out in droves.”). 
 155. See id. (noting that the Tulia defendants began pleading because of “increasingly 
reasonable offers from [the prosecutor,] McEachern, who seemed eager to get the whole affair 
behind him”). 
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bargaining, which inter alia examined the innocence effect.156 In these 
experiments, we administered hypothetical questionnaires involving 
lighter offenses to student participants, following the earlier research 
that found the results of such studies to be commensurate with those 
of more realistic simulations.157 Importantly, Tor et al.’s studies also 
provided participants with precise information regarding their trial 
prospects to avoid eliciting subjective probabilities of conviction and 
to minimize the effects of those potential confounds that had been 
encountered in previous studies.158 
After replicating the innocence effect in Study 1, using a simple 
scenario concerning an academic violation and a mid-range, 60 
percent conviction probability,159 we examined in Study 2 whether the 
effect generalizes to a broader probability range and a different 
scenario.160 Importantly, this second study also controlled for the 
effect of the expected sanction at trial, holding all plea offers equal to 
the expected sanction.161 This design made the results compatible with 
shadow-of-trial models, and the design also made participants’ 
absolute risk attitudes transparent. Plea acceptance under these 
conditions meant risk aversion, its rejection reflected risk seeking, 
and indifference implied risk neutrality.162 
Sixty-four undergraduates from the University of Michigan 
participated in an online survey that used a mixed design that 
manipulated culpability between subjects (so that each participant 
was either in the Guilty or the Innocent condition) as well as the 
probability of conviction within subjects (so that each participant 
considered five different probability levels).163 Participants read a 
scenario about their involvement as drivers in a lethal car accident for 
which they faced criminal charges and in which they personally knew 
whether they had exceeded the speed limit.164 The participants also 
 
 156. See Tor et al., supra note 68, at 103–04 (explaining the setup and results of a test on the 
effect that substantive fairness has on plea acceptance). . 
 157. Houlden, supra note 70, at 279–85. 
 158. Tor et al., supra note 68, at 103–04. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 104–07. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 104. Note, however, that the experimental design aimed to examine the 
systematic differences in risk attitudes between the innocent and the guilty. The experiment was 
not designed to reach general conclusions about defendants’ absolute risk attitudes, which 
depend on a multitude of factors well beyond the scope of the study.  
 163. Id. at 104–07. 
 164. Id. at 105. 
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were told that the outcome of their trial depended on whether the 
prosecution could prove that they had exceeded the speed limit. If the 
prosecution succeeded in doing so, they would be convicted and given 
a mandatory five-year suspension of their driver’s license; otherwise, 
they would walk free.165 
Participants were then asked to decide whether they would 
accept a plea bargain in five different circumstances. They were told 
that “just before the trial, the prosecutor offers you a plea bargain: he 
will drop the current charges if you will plead guilty to a lesser offense 
that carries a significantly lighter sentence.”166 At this point, 
participants read their five plea offers, in which they were asked to 
choose between going to trial—with a five-year sanction and a given 
probability of conviction—and accepting the plea offer.167 In each 
case, the sanction included in the bargain equaled the expected 
sanction at trial.168 Participants then made a series of choices between 
a 5 percent probability of receiving the full five-year suspension and a 
three-month plea bargain; a 30 percent probability and an eighteen-
month offer; and so on.169 
In accordance with their main hypothesis, Tor et al. found that 
innocents were more risk-seeking, overall, than their guilty 
counterparts.170 The results also revealed a significant interaction 
between guilt and probability of conviction, with innocents exhibiting 
greater risk-seeking behavior for most, but not all, of the probability 
range. From very low through low and intermediate probabilities of 
conviction (5 percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent) approximately 30 
percent fewer innocent than guilty participants accepted their plea 
offers.171 The gap between the two groups narrowed, however, for the 
higher (70 percent) conviction probability and disappeared 
altogether—with innocents accepting slightly more plea offers—when 
conviction probability was very high (95 percent).172 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. As the study noted, participants in the innocent condition tended to exhibit 
significant risk seeking. They rejected the plea offer across almost all of the probability ranges, 
with plea acceptance rates of only 17 percent, 7 percent, 20 percent, 43 percent, and 50 percent 
for probability of conviction levels of 5 percent, 30 percent, 50 percent, 70 percent, and 95 
percent, respectively. Guilty condition participants, on the other hand, were significantly more 
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These findings contribute to our understanding of the innocence 
effect in a number of respects. First, they provide evidence for the 
effect when the subjective beliefs of innocent and guilty participants 
are unlikely to diverge, in which circumstances the effect can be 
attributed to the diverging preferences of the two defendant groups. 
Second, the manifestation of the effect across most of the probability 
range—particularly in a within-subjects design that allowed 
participants to consider the different levels of conviction probability 
and the different offers with identical expected values—suggests that 
the innocence effect has broad relevance for shadow-of-trial models. 
Third, the diminishing difference between innocent and guilty 
defendants when conviction is likely and its later disappearance when 
conviction is almost certain reveals a possible boundary to the 
innocence effect. This pattern, in fact, is reminiscent of the behavior 
of the later Tulia defendants, the great majority of whom chose to 
plea bargain, despite their innocence, when faced with virtually 
certain conviction and heavily discounted plea offers.173 
In addition, the Tor et al. study sought to shed further light on 
the role of biased beliefs in the innocence effect, given that earlier 
research had revealed that innocents tend to be more optimistic than 
their guilty counterparts regarding their trial prospects, thereby 
contributing to the innocence effect.174 We hypothesized that 
defendants’ fairness concerns may also lead them to develop biased 
judgments of their culpability.175 Another study by Tor et al. used a 
car accident scenario that included a condition in which the 
defendants were uncertain about their culpability.176 As predicted, the 
participants who did not know whether they had exceeded the speed 
limit—and thus committed the offense with which they were 
charged—behaved like their innocent counterparts, exhibiting the 
same diminished willingness to accept plea offers.177 
 
risk averse, with plea acceptance rates of 47 percent, 38 percent, 56 percent, 53 percent, and 41 
percent for the same five probability levels. Id. at 106.  
 173. See supra note 60 and the accompanying text.  
 174. Bordens, supra note 13, at 65–71; Gregory et al., supra note 13, at 1525.  
 175. Tor et al., supra note 68, at 110–11 (“[This study] tested the hypothesis that defendants 
will exhibit egocentric assessments of culpability in plea bargaining. We expected participants 
who are uncertain of their culpability to behave as if their plea offers were substantively 
unfair.”).  
 176. Id. To increase the robustness of our measures, this study also used a different measure 
of participants’ willingness to accept plea offers from that employed in the previous studies.  
 177. Id.  
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The various experimental studies of plea bargaining thus not 
only corroborate the field evidence of the innocence effect but also 
offer further insight regarding its causes. In accordance with the 
broader psychological literature, these studies reveal that the 
innocence effect exists even when defendants know their objective 
trial prospects. We may therefore infer that plea rejections can be 
driven by the diverging preferences of innocent and guilty defendants 
alone, at least when conviction is not highly likely or nearly certain. In 
fact, fairness concerns appear to be strong enough to lead even 
uncertain defendants—who know that they may in fact be guilty—to 
form biased beliefs of their innocence and to reject objectively fair 
plea offers as if they were innocent and as if the offers were 
consequently unfair.178 More generally, however, innocents’ plea 
reluctance is typically driven by their optimistically biased beliefs 
regarding their trial prospects as well.179 
Altogether, therefore, our empirical and experimental findings 
paint a plea-bargaining picture that differs in important respects from 
what the shadow-of-trial models assume. Part III, therefore, turns to 
examine the positive and normative implications for plea-bargaining 
policy of the innocence effect and its causes. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
Parts I and II documented the innocence effect and explored its 
likely causes. Both field data and experimental studies revealed 
innocents’ reluctance to plea bargain and suggested that this effect 
results from the combination of innocents’ more optimistic 
predictions of trial prospects and their aversion to accepting the 
unjust outcomes of the plea bargain. This Part considers the positive 
implications of the innocence effect in Part III.A, then continues in 
Part III.B to study its normative implications for the extant plea 
bargaining debate and beyond. 
A. Positive Implications 
1.  The Cost of Innocence.  The innocence effect imposes a 
significant, collective cost on innocent defendants. Because of the 
effect, innocents receive higher average sentences than guilty 
defendants who face similar evidence and are charged with similar 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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offenses. This disparity occurs because guilty defendants more often 
plea bargain and thereby reduce their average sentence. 
To illustrate the cost of innocence, suppose that, in all cases with 
an 80 percent conviction probability and a predicted imprisonment 
sentence of ten years, the prosecution offers defendants a plea 
bargain resulting in a five-year imprisonment—that is, a three-year 
discount in prison time compared to the expected trial sentence.180 To 
take the most extreme case, if all innocent defendants were to reject 
this offer but all guilty defendants were to accept it, all of the guilty 
defendants would be sentenced to five years. Eighty percent of the 
innocents, however, would be convicted at trial and sentenced to ten 
years in prison, whereas the remaining 20 percent would be acquitted. 
Thus the average sentence imposed on an innocent in this example is 
eight years in prison. Defendants who chose trial, therefore, are 
sentenced to longer average sentences due to the combined impact of 
plea bargaining and the innocence effect. In contrast, a legal system 
without the plea-bargain mechanism would force all similarly situated 
defendants to face trial and to receive the same average sentences 
regardless of culpability. Of course, the same qualitative result still 
holds for any scenario in which innocent defendants exhibit a 
systematically greater reluctance to plea bargain than their guilty 
counterparts, with the magnitude of the cost of innocence depending 
on the strength of the innocence effect. 
In fact, the above illustration likely understates the magnitude of 
the cost of innocence. If defendants in this example only seek to 
minimize the expected value of their punishment, the prosecution can 
settle for a sentence discount of just over 20 percent to ensure that all 
defendants with a 20 percent acquittal probability accept the offer. In 
practice, however, the available empirical evidence suggests that 
defendants generally are risk seeking: they will risk a higher expected 
sentence to preserve the chance of a full acquittal.181 Plea-bargaining 
prosecutors therefore must offer deeper sentence discounts, which 
inadvertently impose an even greater collective penalty on those plea-
reluctant innocents. 
Independently of the innocence effect, moreover, defendants 
also differ in their willingness to accept plea offers due to their 
 
 180. The expected trial sentence is 10 years × 80% = 8 years.  
 181. Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2338–39; see also Birke, supra note 16, at 208–10 (“[T]he 
most convincing basis for why defendants plead guilty despite loss aversion is that defendants 
are risk seeking in the domain of losses . . . .”).  
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idiosyncratic risk preferences and their assessments of their trial 
prospects. Yet prosecutors in a budget-constrained system, which 
brings to trial only approximately 5 percent of all criminal cases, 
cannot make offers that attract only the average defendant because 
those offers would be accepted only about half of the time. Instead, to 
appeal to the vast majority of defendants, prosecutors must offer 
significantly more lenient sentences than the expected punishment at 
trial.182 Insofar as the innocence effect leads some innocents to reject 
even these deeply discounted plea offers, the dynamics of plea 
bargaining in a budget-constrained system thus further increase the 
cost of innocence. 
Somewhat ironically, the cost of innocence may be even more 
dramatic in those cases in which the probability of acquittal is high. 
Although prosecutors often decline to prosecute these weak cases, 
when they do decide to bring charges they must often waive the 
charges that likely would have resulted in imprisonment if the 
defendants were convicted at trial. As a result, prosecutors must offer 
non-incarceration sanctions, such as community service or probation, 
when they make a plea offer.183 When faced with a high probability of 
acquittal, therefore, plea-bargaining defendants enjoy a sentence that 
is qualitatively different from and dramatically lighter than the 
sentence imposed on their counterparts who are convicted at trial.184 
Consequently, the gap between the average punishment imposed on 
the large majority of guilty pleaders, most of whom are guilty, and the 
average sentence imposed on those few who plead not guilty, 
amongst whom the innocent are overrepresented, is particularly large 
in these cases.185 
 
 182. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 60 (“When the case has a hole in it, however, the 
prosecutor may scale the offer all the way down to probation.” (quoting Chicago defense 
attorney J. Eugene Pincham)); Champion, supra note 8, at 257 (“Interviews with 
several . . . prosecutors revealed that a primary consideration was securing a guilty plea to a 
felonious charge. In weak cases, there was a tendency for them to recommend probation . . . in 
exchange for a guilty plea from the defendant.”).  
 184. In the Tulia cases, for example, all of the defendants who were convicted after a trial 
were sentenced to prison terms, whereas most of those who entered a guilty plea were 
sentenced to other penalties. See supra Part I.C. Of course, it is difficult to know which penalty 
would have been imposed absent the agreement. For this reason, it is difficult to establish 
empirically that agreements that convert prison-term sentences to other punishments are 
common.  
 185. Note also that our experimental findings suggest that the innocence effect is strongest 
for medium-to-high acquittal probabilities, thereby further increasing the cost of innocence in 
these circumstances. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, we should note that our examples refer to the cost of 
innocence whenever there are both innocent and guilty defendants 
who face similar conviction probabilities and similar anticipated 
sentences upon conviction. We do not assert that innocent and guilty 
defendants face similar average probabilities of conviction at trial. 
Nonetheless, because prosecutors usually dismiss very weak cases, the 
remaining defendants—whether innocent or guilty—face a substantial 
risk of conviction.186 If all of these defendants were grouped according 
to their probability of conviction, every resulting group of defendants 
would have included some innocents together with many guilty 
defendants. Because of the innocence effect, however, within each of 
these groups those few innocents would bear higher average sanctions 
than their guilty counterparts.187 
2.  Guilty Bargainers.  Innocent defendants who exhibit a 
significantly greater aversion to pleading guilty than do their guilty 
counterparts reject plea offers that the latter accept when faced with 
similar trial prospects. But prosecutors, who cannot distinguish the 
small innocent minority from the large guilty majority of those that 
they decide to prosecute, must adjust their offers to secure plea 
bargains with nearly all defendants.188 Consequently, plea offers are 
inevitably geared towards the typical, guilty defendant, and are in fact 
accepted by the great majority of the guilty, even as many innocent 
defendants reject such offers. Plea bargains, therefore, 
overwhelmingly lead to the conviction of the guilty. 
 
 186. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2309 (explaining why prosecutors often refrain from 
bringing charges in weak cases); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 719 (“[S]ufficiently weak cases . . . are dismissed.”). 
 187. Innocents are not evenly distributed across the spectrum of conviction probabilities, 
and the evidence suggests that the magnitude of the innocence effect diminishes for very high 
probabilities of conviction, see supra note 172 and accompanying text. Therefore, the magnitude 
of the cost of innocence depends on the probability of conviction. Although the effect obtains 
whenever the innocence effect is manifested, the cost of innocence may be less dramatic than it 
might appear to be, due to the truth-revealing function of trial, which can distinguish between 
the innocent and the guilty beyond the ability of prosecutors. Hypothetically, in cases in which 
prosecutors judge that defendants face certain trial prospects based on the evidence (for 
example, an 80 percent probability of conviction), innocents may face better prospects (for 
example, 70 percent), whereas guilty defendants may face worse prospects (for example, 85 
percent). The somewhat better trial prospects of innocent defendants may therefore partly 
compensate for, and thus reduce, the magnitude of the cost of innocence.  
 188. Of course, prosecutors typically will not pursue charges against defendants whom they 
believe to be innocent based on the available evidence. 
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For instance, a plea offer that is accepted by the guilty 95 percent 
of the time will be accepted by the innocent only in a substantially 
smaller fraction of cases. Yet the ultimate proportion of innocents 
among all guilty pleaders is even smaller than indicated by the 
fraction of those among the innocents who accept the prosecutors’ 
offers. The innocents, after all, comprise only a small minority of all 
criminal defendants to begin with, so it is a small proportion of that 
small minority that will ultimately end up among the ranks of the 
guilty pleaders.189 
Although the guilty tend to be overrepresented among plea 
bargainers beyond their already high prevalence amid criminal 
defendants generally, a closer look at our findings suggests three 
possible limitations to this phenomenon. We found some tentative 
evidence that innocents increasingly accept plea offers when they 
believe that they are facing the death penalty, when they believe that 
their conviction at trial is extremely likely, or when they have falsely 
confessed during the police investigation.190 
The first limitation is straightforward: our provisionary evidence 
indicates that the representation of the guilty among plea bargainers 
in death-penalty cases might not exceed their proportion among 
death-penalty defendants.191 The second similarly implies that 
innocents might plead guilty at rates closer to those of guilty 
defendants when the prosecution’s case against them is particularly 
strong.192 Importantly, however, for the innocence effect to disappear 
under this circumstance, innocents must also believe that they are 
facing nearly certain conviction, which may not happen often.193 In 
other words, although innocents who form reasonably accurate 
beliefs regarding their trial prospects may well behave like the guilty 
when conviction is nearly certain, many over-optimistic innocents will 
be reluctant to plead guilty even under this extreme condition. Hence, 
the innocence effect still may be manifested, with the guilty 
overrepresented—albeit to a lesser degree—among plea bargainers 
who face nearly certain conviction. Finally, the third limitation 
 
 189. To illustrate, if innocent defendants were to comprise 1 percent of all defendants and 
40 percent of these innocents were to accept plea offers that attract 95 percent of the guilty, 
innocent defendants would represent only slightly more than 0.4 percent, or one out of 
approximately 250, of all guilty pleaders.  
 190. See supra Part I.B–C. 
 191. See supra Part I.B.  
 192. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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suggests that innocents who had falsely confessed during an 
investigation may not exhibit plea behavior that is very different from 
the behavior of the guilty.194 
3.  Innocents on Trial.  The immediate result of the innocence 
effect for trial rates is the mirror view of its consequence for plea-
bargain rates. Many innocents—who tend disproportionately to reject 
their plea offers—face a full trial, even as the dramatic majority of 
cases involving guilty defendants are disposed of by plea bargain. 
Therefore, a disproportionately significant fraction of innocent 
defendants are among those criminal defendants on trial, with the 
exact proportion depending on the respective rates of the guilty and 
the innocent in the defendant population and the two groups’ relative 
propensity for plea rejections.195 
Paralleling the analysis of the proportion of the guilty among 
plea bargainers, our tentative evidence indicates that innocents’ 
representation in potential death-penalty trials might not be 
substantially higher than their small base-rate proportion among such 
cases to begin with.196 In the same vein, when conviction at trial is 
nearly certain, some innocents will form reasonably accurate beliefs 
regarding their trial prospects and will behave more like their guilty 
counterparts, but other, optimistic innocents will be reluctant to plea. 
Even under this extreme condition, a diminished innocence effect 
may still exist, so that innocents may be overrepresented among those 
defendants who choose trial, even when conviction is objectively very 
likely.197 On the other hand, innocents who had falsely confessed to 
the police might not be significantly overrepresented amongst those 
defendants who are facing a full trial because we found that they 
often plead guilty as well. 
 
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38.  
 195. Using the proportions in the preceding illustration, supra note 189, for instance, 
innocents would comprise about 11 percent of those criminal defendants facing a full trial. 
 196. See supra Part I.B. 
 197. Note, however, that although the base rate of innocents among defendants with an 
extremely high probability of conviction is even smaller than their already small fraction of all 
defendants, their overrepresentation among those who stand trial in these circumstances should 
still amount to a noticeable absolute fraction. For example, if even 0.5 percent of the defendants 
in these strong cases were innocent, but the guilty-plea rate of the innocent were 70 percent 
while the guilty-plea rate of the guilty were 99 percent, then the innocent would still comprise 
just under 13 percent of defendants in the jury trials in these cases. 
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4.  A Diminished Rate of Wrongful Convictions.  Beyond its 
effect on the proportions of the guilty among plea bargainers and the 
innocent among those who stand trial, the innocence effect also 
beneficially combines with plea bargaining to reduce the rate of 
wrongful convictions, compared to a hypothetical criminal-justice 
system that requires all defendants go through a full-fledged trial, for 
at least two reasons. First and most importantly, without plea 
bargaining, some guilty defendants who now plead guilty inevitably 
would have been acquitted at trial, thereby increasing the rate of the 
innocent among those convicted in court.198 The rate of wrongful 
conviction is more important than the absolute number, for otherwise 
we would randomly exonerate every second convict, assuring that the 
number of wrongful convictions drops by half as the rate remains the 
same.199 
Second, the plea bargains that are made with most defendants 
free resources for the trials of those few defendants who contest the 
charges, thereby improving the accuracy of these trials and allowing 
for the provision of stronger protections for the innocent. If all 
criminal proceedings led instead to full trials, resource constraints 
would force the criminal-justice system to lower the cost—and thus 
the quality—of trials to maintain a reasonable level of enforcement.200 
 
 198. Because guilty defendants are overrepresented in the group of guilty pleaders as a 
result of the innocence effect, forcing all guilty pleaders to opt for a jury trial will increase the 
rate of guilty defendants at jury trials and thus would increase the rate of guilty defendants 
acquitted.  
 199. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2310 (“Reducing the number of wrongful 
prosecutions just by reducing the number of total prosecutions makes no more sense than 
arbitrarily exonerating a random number of inmates, since some of them are likely to be 
innocent.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1934 (noting that a reduction in the number of 
wrongful convictions without a corresponding reduction in their proportion is not socially 
desirable). 
 200. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1932 (arguing that if plea bargaining were banned, 
the increase in the number of trials would inevitably result in economizing the trials, which, in 
turn, would lead to an increased number of errors). In fact, historical studies show that plea 
bargains have evolved largely in response to the development of criminal defendants’ privileges 
and rights. John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 261, 263–67 (1979). One can see a distinct connection between the expansion of 
protections for defendants and the developing pressure to adopt plea bargaining in different 
countries. Thus, in Italy, the transition from the inquisitorial method to the adversarial method 
that gave the defendant several new legal rights at trial was accompanied by the infiltration of 
plea bargains as a central component in the judicial system. William T. Pizzi & Mariangela 
Montagna, The Battle To Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429, 
439–42 (2004). In Germany, the increasing complexity of trials was a significant catalyst in the 
development of plea bargains. Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: 
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Plea bargains leave the vast majority of defendants out of court, 
thereby allowing the judiciary to ensure complex, costly, and 
altogether higher-quality trials for those defendants who nevertheless 
choose trial, including most innocents.201 
B. Normative Implications 
Our findings on the innocence effect demonstrate that the 
common assumption that culpability is irrelevant for plea behavior is 
plainly mistaken. Not only does defendants’ willingness to accept plea 
offers depend on their culpability, but the resulting plea-bargain and 
trial rates are affected as well. This conclusion further reveals that the 
related, near-universal scholarly belief that plea bargaining routinely 
generates false guilty pleas is overstated, though not wholly 
erroneous. Innocents are less likely to plead guilty than shadow-of-
trial models assume, even in the face of attractive plea offers, except 
possibly when they believe that conviction is extremely likely, when 
they are facing the death penalty, or when they had falsely confessed 
during the investigation. 
Part III.A explained the positive implications of the innocence 
effect under extant plea-bargaining practices. On the one hand, the 
innocence effect combines with plea-bargaining practices to impose a 
striking cost on innocent defendants, who bear higher average 
sanctions than their similarly-situated guilty counterparts.202 On the 
other hand, the effect also generates two significant benefits under 
the current plea-bargaining regime: first, it brings about an 
overrepresentation of the guilty among plea bargainers and the 
innocent among those defendants who face full criminal trials;203 
second, the innocence effect causes a reduction in the rate of 
wrongful convictions compared to a hypothetical system without plea 
bargaining.204 
After examining the normative implications of these findings for 
the positions of both supporters and detractors of plea bargaining, 
this Part offers our own proposals for minimizing false convictions, 
 
The Globalization of Plea-Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 45–46 (2004). 
 201. See supra note 200. 
 202. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 203. See supra Part III.A.2–3. 
 204. See supra Part III.A.4. 
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better protecting the innocent, and improving the plea bargaining 
process altogether by accounting for the innocence effect. 
1.  Plea Detraction for Plea Supporters.  Plea-bargaining 
proponents emphasize the legitimate interest of innocents in 
minimizing their individual harm. Plea bargains provide an 
alternative to the costly and risky trial, during which innocents may 
be detained or suffer other restrictions, and at the end of which they 
may even face a harsh, undeserved penalty. In the eyes of many 
supporters of the practice, the important insurance that plea 
bargaining provides to those willing innocents should not be revoked 
in the name of protecting innocent defendants generally, in the 
abstract.205 
Our findings should give pause to these plea-bargaining 
supporters for a number of related reasons. For one, our analysis 
reveals that the insurance provided by plea bargaining predominantly 
benefits the guilty, who tend to accept plea offers, rather than the 
innocent, who more often refuse the plea and choose to face trial 
instead.206 In fact, the experimental evidence tentatively indicates that 
the innocence effect may be particularly pronounced in cases with a 
low-to-intermediate probability of conviction, although further 
research is needed to establish the robustness of this finding.207 If 
further research confirms our findings, then the same conditions of 
greater variance in trial outcomes that make the insurance function of 
plea bargaining particularly valuable—that is, when both conviction 
and acquittal are quite plausible—also incline innocent defendants 
more often to reject this insurance. Similarly, although there are some 
indications that the significance of the innocence effect may diminish 
when conviction is nearly certain, this is precisely the circumstance in 
which the insurance function of plea bargaining also is least valuable. 
Plea-bargaining supporters might respond that plea bargaining 
still provides insurance-like benefits to some innocents, namely the 
 
 205. See Bowers, supra note 12, at 1120–21 (claiming that plea bargains are especially 
beneficial to innocent defendants); Church, Jr., supra note 12, at 515–16 (critiquing Professor 
Alschuler’s objection to plea bargaining with innocents, Alschuler, supra note 3); Robert E. 
Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent 
Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2013 (1992) (“[Professor Schulhofer, supra note 6,] attacks our 
analysis because we want innocent defendants to be able to plead, if they so choose, under the 
best possible terms. In Schulhofer’s view, they are better off going to trial, whether they think so 
or not.”). 
 206. See supra Part III.A.2.  
 207. See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
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ones who derive the greatest insurance value from the plea offer and 
therefore choose plea over trial despite the innocence effect. 
Moreover, offering the plea option to innocent defendants guarantees 
that the many innocents who refuse to plea are consciously taking the 
risk of wrongful conviction at trial. But our analysis further shows 
that plea rejections typically reflect not only innocents’ fairness-
driven preferences but also a systematic, optimistic bias regarding 
their trial prospects.208 Therefore, if they were unbiased, at least some 
innocents who presently refuse to plea bargain would accept their 
plea offers. These defendants unwittingly give up the insurance of the 
plea bargain that their guilty counterparts routinely enjoy and instead 
face a significant trial risk against their own risk preferences. 
The cost of innocence, however, poses an even more significant 
problem for plea proponents, who primarily aim to minimize 
innocents’ actual individual harm.209 The combination of plea 
bargaining and the innocence effect imposes higher average penalties 
on innocents than on guilty defendants who face similar conviction 
probabilities and sentences upon conviction. Because innocent 
defendants receive harsher average sentences, for instance, the 
proportion of innocent inmates in prison at any given time is higher 
than it would have been absent plea bargaining. Yet this collective 
harm to innocent defendants would not occur in a no-plea system, 
which avoids the disproportional selection of guilty defendants to 
plea bargaining and innocent defendants to trial. Paradoxically, 
therefore, the goal of harm minimization that traditionally is so 
important to plea-bargaining supporters may be better served by the 
restriction—rather than the encouragement—of plea bargaining. 
2.  Plea Support for Plea Detractors.  Opponents often argue that 
plea bargaining is wrong because it puts pressure on innocent 
defendants falsely to plead guilty and thereby facilitates wrongful 
convictions, an assumed phenomenon that is also known as the 
“innocence problem.”210 In fact, plea detractors typically assert that 
society must not consciously embrace a procedure that facilitates false 
 
 208. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 210. For discussion of the innocence problem in plea bargaining, see Russell D. Covey, 
Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 77–83 (2009); 
Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2297; Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1981; and supra note 11 and 
accompanying text.  
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guilty pleas, the individual preferences of those falsely pleading 
defendants who wish to avoid the risk of trial notwithstanding.211 
The argument against false pleading is based in part on society’s 
moral obligation to prevent wrongful convictions,212 an obligation 
familiarly manifested by statements to the effect that “[b]etter that 
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”213 Plea 
bargains are said to violate this principle because they lead to the 
conviction of some innocents who would have been acquitted in 
court.214 Furthermore, plea-bargaining opponents assert that 
knowingly convicting the innocent—as they assume plea bargaining 
routinely does—is morally wrong, irrespective of the direct costs of 
trials for the innocent and for society at large.215 According to this 
view, forcing all defendants to face the risk of a harsher sentence at 
trial is morally preferable to guaranteeing some wrongful convictions 
through guilty pleas.216 Hence, plea-bargaining detractors argue that 
although those inevitably imperfect trials sometimes produce 
wrongful convictions, it is important for such occasional unjust results 
to follow a genuine effort on the part of the criminal-justice system to 
get to the truth.217 
 
 211. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 714 (criticizing plea bargaining for yielding a larger 
number of wrongful convictions than trial); Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1986 (“A large body of 
legal doctrine attests to the importance of assuring that innocents will not be convicted, whether 
or not they themselves would prefer to avoid the risks of a high sentence after trial.”).  
 212. See A.A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 125 (1989) (“The 
protection of the innocent from conviction is a central theme of the law of criminal 
evidence. . . . The importance of protecting the innocent from conviction is not justified only on 
the basis that it will produce the best social results.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970) (“It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of 
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”). 
 213. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. Note that the 1:10 ratio is not 
universally accepted. Historically, scholars offered numerous alternative ratios to better reflect 
the balance between the interest in convicting the guilty and the need to insure the acquittal of 
the innocent. For a review of the different opinions on this matter, see generally Alexander 
Volokh, Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). 
 214. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 60 (“[A] more serious criticism . . . is that the greatest 
pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent.”); Schulhofer, 
supra note 6, at 1985 (“[C]onviction of the innocent produces serious negative externalities.”).  
 215. See DWORKIN, supra note 124, at 72 (“People have a profound right not to be 
convicted of crimes of which they are innocent. . . . [I]t would be no justification or defense that 
convicting [an innocent] person would spare the community some expense or in some other way 
improve the general welfare.”).  
 216. See supra note 211.  
 217. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 11, at 714 (“A procedure that is designed to determine 
who is guilty and who is innocent seems almost certain to accomplish this task more effectively 
than a procedure that is deliberately designed to evade the issue.”). 
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Notably, plea-bargaining opponents also place a much higher 
value on reducing the rate, or proportion, of wrongful convictions 
among convictions overall than they do on reducing the severity of 
the sentences meted out to those unfortunate innocents who are still 
wrongfully convicted. Scholars in this camp, for example, find it 
morally preferable that only a single innocent defendant rather than 
ten innocents be convicted, even if the punishment inflicted on the 
single innocent equals the punishment that would have been meted 
out to all of the latter ten together.218 
Yet our findings reveal how the same considerations that 
historically were employed to criticize plea bargains suggest that this 
practice is less problematic than previously believed—maybe even 
socially beneficial—for two related reasons. First, the innocence 
effect means that plea bargainers are predominantly guilty, while 
innocents disproportionately refuse the plea and go to trial, which 
might result in their acquittal. Second, the innocence effect also 
combines with plea bargaining to diminish the rate of wrongful 
convictions when compared to the all-trial system traditionally 
preferred by those opposed to plea bargaining.219 In other words, 
because of the innocence effect, plea bargains lead to beneficial, 
lower rates of wrongful convictions. 
Altogether, therefore, our findings reveal that insofar as the rate 
of wrongful conviction is the relevant normative yardstick, the harm 
of plea bargains is smaller and their benefits are greater than 
previously believed. 
3. Restrictions on Plea Offers.  The preceding analysis 
demonstrates that the innocence effect at least weakens the 
traditional arguments of both camps in the plea-bargaining 
controversy, even if it does not mandate the actual reversal of their 
respective attitudes towards the practice. Because of the innocence 
effect, plea bargains impose a significant collective cost on innocents 
and promote the interests of most innocents much less than plea-
bargaining supporters assert. But neither do plea bargains increase 
the rate of wrongful convictions, as some plea-bargaining opponents 
argue. Yet perhaps intermediate solutions—between the polar 
 
 218. See, e.g., id. (arguing that a system that convicts ten innocent defendants and sentences 
each of them to one year of imprisonment is worse than a system that mistakenly convicts one 
defendant at trial and sentences him to ten years). 
 219. See supra Part III.A.4. 
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opposites of the absolute freedom to make plea offers practiced today 
and a complete ban on plea bargaining—may help simultaneously to 
minimize wrongful convictions and harm to those convicted 
innocents. 
One way to reduce the negative effect of plea bargaining on the 
sentences of wrongfully convicted innocents is to limit the magnitude 
of plea discounts or, alternatively, of trial penalties.220 The law could 
instruct judges to reject plea agreements that include a sentence that 
is significantly lower than the sentence expected following conviction 
by a jury trial. This curtailment of prosecutors’ ability to offer 
significant sentence discounts will result in plea rejections by those 
defendants who require deeper discounts in exchange for their guilty 
pleas. Because the innocent are less willing to plead guilty and hence 
only accept plea offers with large sentence discounts,221 the proportion 
of innocents among those who plead guilty will be reduced, as will the 
number and rate of wrongful convictions. At the same time, 
moreover, the lower trial penalty guarantees a reduction in the 
problematic cost of innocence.222 
Although the main normative goal of plea opponents is to reduce 
the rate of wrongful convictions, plea proponents predominantly are 
concerned with reducing the sentences that are imposed on convicted 
innocents. Yet restricting the guilty-plea discount also will minimize 
the gap between sentences meted out to those who opt for a trial—
including a large proportion of the innocent—and those imposed on 
guilty pleaders, whose ranks are dominated by the guilty. Of course, 
the cost of innocence will not completely disappear even with such 
restrictions because innocents who are wrongfully convicted by a jury 
 
 220. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1127 (supporting a fixed-discount system for guilty pleas 
to ensure that weak cases would result in a trial); Wright, supra note 4, at 111 (arguing for 
“practices that offer only modest plea discounts to defendants” to increase the confidence in 
criminal convictions); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea 
Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 781–82 (1998) 
(suggesting that the plea-bargaining process be replaced by a system that relies on fixed, written 
sentencing discounts).  
 221. See supra Part II.B. 
 222. A similar proposal previously was offered by one of us as a means of discouraging 
prosecutors from filing charges in weak cases. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2313–30 
(arguing that partially banning plea bargaining would encourage prosecutors to refrain from 
bringing weak cases but not strong cases). But the suggestion in this Article has a different goal: 
by restricting guilty plea discounts, the law can reduce both the number of innocent defendants 
who plead guilty and their proportion among all guilty pleaders. Such a restriction, moreover, 
would not be detrimental to plea bargaining generally because it would still allow prosecutors to 
bargain with most guilty defendants.  
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will still be sentenced to longer average terms than guilty pleaders. 
But the gap between the two groups will shrink. 
Practically speaking, imposing limits on sentence bargains would 
not be particularly difficult. Courts could be instructed to reject plea 
bargains if the proposed sentence is substantially lower than that 
imposed in similar circumstances following a full trial.223 On the other 
hand, limiting charge bargaining or fact bargaining is much harder, 
because the parties can often justify the changes in charges and facts 
on an evidentiary basis. Nevertheless, even charge-bargaining 
restrictions might still be effective if courts were instructed to reject 
plea agreements unless the remaining charges “adequately reflect the 
seriousness of the actual offense behavior.”224 Of course, prosecutors 
still could find ways to continue making charge bargains on the sly, 
but most prosecutors likely would abide by the rules if they were 
instructed to expose the details of each plea agreement, which would 
allow courts to review charge bargaining as well.225 
4.  Agreements on a Simplified Criminal Process.  Another 
alternative that may satisfy the interests of both camps in the plea-
bargaining debate involves bargaining for a simplified criminal 
process, an option that scholars previously offered to address other 
concerns with extant plea-bargain practices.226 The law could 
encourage parties to substitute, in return for a sentence discount, a 
shorter, simplified process for plea-bargain agreements. For instance, 
parties could agree on a bench trial in place of a jury trial.227 Similarly, 
they could agree that the defendant will testify before the prosecution 
presents its case. Or they could make other stipulations that reduce 
the cost of trial for the prosecution. We speculate that innocent 
defendants will be more willing to forego some of their procedural 
 
 223. Id. at 2341. 
 224. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a) (2004); accord Gazal-Ayal, supra 
note 41, at 2340–41; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal-Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the 
Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 360 (2006) (“[T]he prevention of charge and fact bargaining is 
crucial to the efficacy of any sentencing guidelines . . . .”). 
 225. For a detailed description of such an approach, see Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2340–
41.  
 226. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 
1087–93 (1984) (proposing a bench-trial discount as an alternative to guilty-plea discounts); see 
also John Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 
204, 225 (1979) (proposing the adoption of the German simplified trial methods as an 
alternative to plea bargaining). 
 227. Schulhofer, supra note 226, at 1087–93.  
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rights in return for a lower expected sentence than to plead guilty, so 
long as they can maintain their innocence throughout the process.228 
Of course, a simplified process has some disadvantages. Most 
notably, it may offer defendants a lower probability of acquittal 
compared to a full jury trial with its additional protections. And, more 
generally, a simplified process might increase the likelihood of error 
compared to a full-fledged trial.229 On balance, however, the many 
benefits of agreements on a simplified process with respect to both 
wrongful convictions and harm to convicted innocents outweigh their 
disadvantages. 
First, simplified procedures will promote the interest of innocent 
defendants in obtaining sentence discounts while still allowing them 
to benefit from a real legal process, aimed at finding the truth. 
Indeed, although the cost of simplified procedures is higher than that 
of a traditional guilty plea, the cost gap between the two is smaller in 
a substantially simplified process. Additionally, most guilty 
defendants who currently plead guilty will continue to do so even 
when offered the option of a simplified process.230 After all, to be 
acquitted in a simplified procedure, guilty defendants would still have 
to lie to the judge, something most defendants likely find to be 
psychologically difficult, particularly in the common scenario in which 
lying probably will not overcome conclusive evidence.231 In addition, 
the prosecution typically has very strong cases. Therefore, guilty 
defendants would tend to avoid even the small personal and 
monetary cost of a simplified trial.232 We already discussed the finding, 
moreover, that most guilty defendants report after the fact that they 
had made a guilty plea simply because they were guilty.233 
Second, some innocent defendants who would have opted for 
trial—absent another alternative to plea bargaining—would now 
probably choose a simplified procedure. Because these procedures 
 
 228. This dynamic may well be facilitated by innocents’ optimistic beliefs regarding the trial 
process. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.  
 229. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1932 (“Reducing the process, in turn, logically 
implies increasing the rate of error.”).  
 230. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 942–45 (1983) (arguing that 
guilty-plea rates would still be high in the absence of plea bargaining).  
 231. Id. For reasons defendants give for pleading guilty, see supra notes 23–26 and 
accompanying text. 
 232. Alschuler, supra note 230, at 944.  
 233. See supra notes 23, 26 and accompanying text. 
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are cheaper than full trials, however, judicial resources will be spared. 
These resources could be channeled toward implementing a 
simplified process that is more beneficial to innocents than plea 
bargaining is, thereby advancing innocents’ interests without 
requiring additional resources. 
Third, simplified procedures may reduce wrongful convictions. 
Despite the reluctance of many innocents to plead guilty, some still 
do so, either because they desire to end their criminal proceeding 
quickly or because they fear the harsher consequences of a wrongful 
jury conviction. Yet a simplified procedure could provide these 
innocents with the opportunity to challenge the charges against them 
in a setting that diminishes their concerns about a lengthy procedure 
or a dramatically harsher sanction. 
Finally, even in cases in which a simplified process occasionally 
would lead to a wrongful conviction, the moral gravity of this 
undesirable outcome would be smaller, having followed an honest 
judicial attempt to find the truth. Notably, studies on procedural 
fairness indicate that even defendants who are dissatisfied with trial 
outcomes tend to accept those outcomes if they had been given an 
opportunity to argue their case before an impartial arbiter before the 
verdict.234 In fact, simplified procedures might provide defendants 
with an even better opportunity to present their story than the 
adversarial jury trial can.235 
CONCLUSION 
This Article marshals forth evidence of the innocence effect, 
which is the systematically greater reluctance of innocents to plea 
bargain compared to guilty defendants. Part II shes some light on the 
causes of this effect, showing that it typically results from a 
combination of innocents’ greater optimism regarding their trial 
prospects and their increased risk seeking compared to guilty 
defendants, and occasionally from asymmetric information as well. 
Part III examines the implications of the innocence effect and its 
 
 234. Cf., e.g., Tyler, supra note 18, at 119 (“[P]eople’s assessments of the fairness of third-
party decision-making procedures shape their satisfaction with their outcomes. . . . [W]hen 
third-party decisions are fairly made people are more willing to accept them voluntarily.” 
(citation omitted)).  
 235. In general, criminal law effectively encourages defendants not to tell their story and 
choose to remain silent. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal 
Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005) (describing and critiquing the incentives provided by 
the criminal-justice system that enable the silencing of defendants).  
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causes. We reveal the striking cost of innocence: the innocence effect 
combines with extant plea-bargain practices to impose harsher 
sanctions on the average innocent compared to the average guilty 
among defendants facing similar charges and conviction probabilities. 
At the same time, our analysis also shows how the innocence effect 
combines with plea bargaining to produce the beneficial consequence 
of reducing the rate of wrongful convictions when compared to a 
hypothetical criminal-justice system in which trial is the only option. 
Finally, Part III also explains how these findings require both plea-
bargaining opponents and its proponents to reevaluate their 
traditional positions. Opponents, whose traditional hostility toward 
the practice is based on their belief that plea bargaining facilitates 
wrongful convictions, should actually support the practice. 
Conversely, proponents, who emphasize innocents’ interest in the 
lighter sentences that are offered by plea bargains, should oppose this 
practice that predominantly and disproportionately benefits the guilty 
because it imposes a collective cost on those trial-bound innocents. 
We conclude with our own proposals for minimizing false convictions, 
better protecting the innocent, and improving the plea-bargaining 
process altogether by accounting for the innocence effect. 
Empirical research on the factors that shape plea-bargaining 
decision making is in its infancy. Even with respect to the innocence 
effect, plea-bargaining policy would greatly benefit from further 
empirical evidence that would help to quantify the relative magnitude 
of the effect under different circumstances in the defendant 
population. We still need to learn, for instance, whether the type or 
cause of defendants’ innocence impacts the reluctance to plea 
bargain. That is, defendants charged with a crime they did not commit 
may well react differently from those whose innocence stems from the 
absence of a required mental component or from the existence of a 
legal defense to the charges. We have only established the innocence 
effect with respect to the first of these categories of innocence. 
Another important topic for future study is whether the nature 
of the evidence against them affects defendants’ willingness to plead 
guilty. Our exoneration database indicated, for example, that 
defendants who falsely confess to the police also demonstrate a 
greater tendency to plead guilty in court.236 We already noted, 
however, that this pattern sheds no light on whether these guilty pleas 
were facilitated by the earlier false confession or if both the 
 
 236. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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confession and the guilty plea were manifestations of some other case 
characteristic, such as a defendant who is particularly vulnerable.237 
Similarly, there is room for additional research on the impact of 
the strength of the evidence that a defendant is facing on the 
innocence effect. Our tentative findings—from the behavior of the 
later Tulia defendants and from one experimental test—suggest that 
the innocence effect significantly diminishes when the probability of 
conviction is extremely high.238 But this important possibility requires 
further exploration and corroboration. 
Finally and related, plea-bargaining policy would benefit from 
learning whether factors that have been shown more generally to 
increase defendants’ willingness to plead guilty, such as the pressure 
exerted by one’s defense attorney,239 impact the guilty and the 
innocent differently. One particularly pervasive factor in this 
category, for example, is the time that defendants spend in pretrial 
detention, which multiple studies have linked to an increased 
willingness to plea bargain.240 Unsurprisingly, moreover, the effect of 
detention appears to be especially strong when defendants are 
charged with a misdemeanor offense and the prosecution offers an 
 
 237. See supra note 37. 
 238. One experimental study showed that the willingness among the guilty to accept plea 
bargains does not change when the chances for conviction rise from 50 percent to 90 percent, 
whereas among the innocent the difference is much more significant. Bordens, supra note 13, at 
67. Another study found that when the chance of conviction is extremely high, the difference in 
the willingness to accept a plea bargain between the innocent and the guilty nearly disappears. 
Tor et al., supra note 68, at 106.  
 239. For a review of the different ways in which attorneys influence defendants’ decisions 
and actions, see Alschuler, supra note 14, at 1191–95. An extensive field study of this issue 
showed that a substantial number of defendants that refused to plead guilty changed their minds 
at the last minute following their attorney’s advice. JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, 
NEGOTIATED JUSTICE: PRESSURES TO PLEAD GUILTY 39–56 (1977). 
 240. E.g., Gail Kellough & Scot Wortley, Remand for Plea: Bail Decisions and Plea 
Bargaining as Commensurate Decisions, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 186, 198 (2002); William M. 
Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 
329–69 (1974). When defendants are detained, they have a greater incentive to end the 
proceedings quickly. In a field study that examined inconsistent admissions among women 
prisoners, the results revealed that the desire to end the pretrial detention was one of the main 
reasons that the prisoners accepted a plea bargain. See DELL, supra note 23, at 31–32. Even if 
they were not arrested, many defendants would be willing to accept a plea bargain to save 
themselves the ongoing legal proceeding. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE 
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 195 (1992) (“Even if [the 
defendants] have free counsel, the time and effort necessary to mount a defense can quickly 
come to outweigh the magnitude of the sanction that the defendant is seeking to avoid.”).  
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immediate release from jail in a plea bargain for time served.241 The 
limited available data on this form of plea bargaining indicates that 
the practice is widespread. For example, in New York City more than 
5 to 12 percent of felony arrestees who are convicted are sentenced to 
time served,242 almost always following a guilty plea.243 For some 
misdemeanors, moreover, the frequency of time-served sentences is 
much higher.244 Again, however, the extant evidence in this area fails 
to distinguish between innocent and guilty defendants. Yet we 
speculate that extremely attractive offers of immediate release for 
time served may well diminish the innocence effect in a pattern 
resembling the behavior of the later Tulia innocents—who nearly all 
pleaded guilty when they faced extremely attractive plea offers in 
light of a certain conviction and heavy sanctions at trial.245 
The early stage of empirical plea-bargaining research 
notwithstanding, the significant evidence of the innocence effect 
presented here makes it apparent that the legal literature’s reliance 
on the shadow-of-trial model is excessive. Thus, apart from the 
important positive and normative implications developed here, this 
Article serves to illustrate both the great benefits of and the need for 
further empirical studies of plea bargaining, the institutional practice 
responsible for the overwhelming majority of criminal convictions. 
 
 241. See HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 47–48 (1982) (describing the 
pressure on defendants in pretrial detention to plead guilty and gain immediate release); Bibas, 
supra note 3, at 2493 (“[P]retrial detention places a high premium on quick plea bargains in 
small cases, even if the defendant would probably win acquittal at an eventual trial.”).  
 242. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., N.Y. STATE, NEW YORK STATE: ADULT ARRESTS 
DISPOSED (2012), available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nys.pdf.  
 243. Guilty pleas account for more than 99 percent of convictions in the courts in New York 
City. CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF N. Y. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 18 (2012), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/criminal/AnnualReport2011.pdf (showing that only 291 
convictions resulted from jury trials while 135,474 resulted from guilty pleas). This phenomenon 
of course is not limited to New York City, as shown by Bureau of Justice data, although further 
discussion of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of the present analysis. See Type of Pretrial 
Release or Detention of Felony Defendants in the 75 Largest Counties, UNIV. AT ALBANY, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5552006.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (providing that 
37 percent of felony defendants are held until disposition on bail and that 5 percent are held 
without bail).  
 244. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF, DAVID B. ROTTMAN & ROB WEIDNER WITH FRED 
CHEESMAN, RANDALL HANSEN, BRIAN J. OSTROM & RICHARD CURTIS, DISPENSING JUSTICE 
LOCALLY: THE IMPACTS, COST AND BENEFITS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT 2.21–
2.24 (2002) (reporting rates as high as 53 percent for certain offenses).  
 245. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the behavior of 
defendants like Kelly Jarrett and Kerry Max Cook, discussed supra note 29, provides anecdotal 
evidence that some level of the innocence effect remains even in serious cases in which 
defendants are offered the opportunity to plead guilty in exchange for time served.  
